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What is the guiding purpose behind the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses? That question has preoccupied scholars and judges for some 
years now. As critics from various perspectives have remarked, for a long 
time the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence suffered from two flaws: 
a tendency to rely on slogans and catch-phrases rather than arguments 
from fundamental purposes,1 and a tendency to treat the two religion 
provisions, non-establishment and free exercise, separately rather than as a 
unified framework for relating government to religion.2
Over the last two decades, widespread dissatisfaction with the Court’s 
efforts inspired a number of general theories about the purposes of the two 
clauses taken together. Scholars have suggested various values, or 
combinations of values, that the Religion Clauses should be interpreted to 
serve.3
 1. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a Liberty, 
Equality, and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871, 887 (1999) (arguing that “traditional 
separationist doctrine is sometimes unpersuasive because it resolves cases solely in terms of mega 
principles and rules” and fails “to explain how and why ostensibly modest connections between 
government and religion realistically risk the undermining of religious liberty”); Michael W. 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 685, 685 (1992) (“[C]onflicts over the Religion Clauses [have been] mired in slogans and 
multipart tests that could be manipulated to reach almost any result.”). 
 2. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 340 
(1996) (reading the two clauses as “inconsistent” should be “a last resort interpretation, after 
exhausting all attempts to reconcile the[m]”); Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment: Where Is the Supreme Court Heading?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 195 (1989) (arguing 
that the Court has made “a fundamental mistake” by “looking at the two clauses in isolation and giving 
them a different cast”); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the 
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 1007–08 (1986) (arguing that 
conflict between the two clauses can be easily avoided). 
 3. These include at least four predominant views. First, equal treatment between religion and 
nonreligious conscientious views. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, 
Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79. 
Second, protection of individual liberty and choice in religious matters. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 
2; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992); Gail 
Merel, Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First 
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978). Third, strict separation of church and state. See, e.g., 
Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separation of Church and 
State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035 (2002); Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: 
Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111 (2002). Fourth, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/5
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One plausible candidate for a unified principle is the protection of 
America’s minority religions and their adherents. Under such a theory, the 
Religion Clauses together should be read to protect minority religious 
beliefs and practices from being burdened by government and, as much as 
possible, to equalize the status of minority religions before the government 
with that of majority faiths. Such an approach starts with plausibility 
because the rights provisions of the Constitution are, in significant part, 
measures to protect minorities from the majority. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, a number of commentators have already analyzed the Religion 
Clauses through the lens of protecting minority faiths.4
A minority-protection approach can make important contributions to 
Religion Clause analysis. For example, the protection of religious 
minorities may provide the most compelling normative reason for strictly 
separating church and state.5 Strict church-state separationism has lost 
much influence among the courts recently; but if there are good arguments 
for the strict separation ideal, one of them is that religious minorities will 
fare better when majoritarian government is kept far from religious life. 
Protection of minority faiths and their adherents might also provide the 
best normative argument for an active judicial role in cases concerning 
government and religion. At this moment, Religion Clause doctrine leaves 
protection of society from intrusions by powerful religion. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the 
Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. 
Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123. 
 Various combinations of liberty, church-state separation, and equality or “neutrality” are urged in, 
for example, Brownstein, supra note 1 (combination of liberty and equality); Frederick M. Gedicks, A 
Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002) (neutrality theory with 
components of separationism); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious 
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002) (combination of neutrality and 
separationism); Steven Shiffin, A Pluralistic Theory of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9 
(2004). 
 4. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A 
CRITICAL HISTORY OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997); Stephen M. Feldman, Religious 
Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
222 (2003) [hereinafter Feldman, Religious Minorities]; Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious 
Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Laws Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 153 (1996); Rosalie Berger Levinson, First Monday—The Dark Side of Federalism 
in the Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47 (1998); Suzanna 
Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 499 (1998); David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 
77 (1991). 
 I am grateful to Professor Feldman for making kind comments on my previous work tracing 
attitudes toward Roman Catholicism in modern religious freedom decisions and for challenging me to 
undertake a similar examination of religious freedom doctrine and minority faiths. See Feldman, 
Religious Minorities, supra, at 224–27 (citing Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-
State Relations, 33 LOYOLA CHI. L. REV. 121 (2001)). 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the resolution of two central issues to the political branches, which may 
put the liberties and equal civil status of minority faiths at risk. With 
respect to government aid to religious education, Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris6 holds that states may provide vouchers to families who will use 
them at religious schools;7 but last Term’s decision in Locke v. Davey8 
holds that states do not have to extend educational aid to students who will 
use it to train for the ministry.9 Zelman and Locke together suggest that 
states will have discretion over questions of financial aid such as school 
vouchers. But such discretion will tend to produce majoritarian results: 
religious schools will fare well in voucher debates in states where their 
sponsoring denominations are politically powerful, and fare poorly where 
their denominations have less power. 
Likewise, after Employment Division v. Smith,10 the government may 
exempt religious practices from the restrictions imposed by laws of 
general applicability,11 but in most cases, it does not have to do so.12 Smith 
conceded that this combination of rules—“leaving accommodation to the 
political process”—“may place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in.”13 If there is a compelling case 
for judicial intervention in religion cases, it must rest heavily on the 
protection of religious minorities. 
I should make clear that, in my view, the protection and equalization of 
minority faiths should not be the sole criterion for Religion Clause cases. 
The First Amendment guarantees free exercise of religion, with no 
qualification limiting the freedom to minority faiths; nor is there any 
indication that the Establishment Clause becomes inapplicable if a 
minority faith is established. Under any plausible constitutional 
interpretation, majority faiths have rights to practice and spread their 
beliefs in certain basic ways (even though there are, of course, many 
questions about the outer scope of religious freedom). Such basic rights 
are protected even when they have effects that members of minority faiths 
regard as negative. 
 6. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 7. Id. at 662–63.
 8. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 9. Id. at 719–20. For arguments distinguishing vouchers from Davey, see Thomas C. Berg & 
Douglas Laycock, Davey’s Mistakes and the Future of State Payments for Services Provided by 
Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L. REV. 227, 247–53 (2004). 
 10. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 11. Id. at 890. 
 12. Id. at 878. 
 13. Id. at 890. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/5
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Nevertheless, the protection and equal status of minority faiths and 
adherents is a significant purpose of religious freedom, even if not the sole 
or conclusive one. Therefore, it should be valuable to isolate the minority-
protection criterion and analyze what it would mean if it were applied 
consistently to religion cases. This Article explores such an approach and 
its implications for the leading categories of government-religion disputes. 
I build on the analyses of other scholars and agree with many of their 
arguments. But in other respects, I critique them and reach quite different 
conclusions about where a minority-protection approach, best conceived, 
leads. 
Part I of the Article offers reasons why the protection of minority 
religions should be an important consideration in interpreting the Religion 
Clauses. Part II then addresses various difficulties and complications in the 
idea of protecting minority faiths. In addition to the fact that the 
constitutional text protects all religious faiths, there are difficulties in the 
effort to define which faiths are minorities. Because of America’s complex 
patterns of religious identities, who is a minority will often vary depending 
on the geographical location, on the institutional setting in which a 
particular legal issue arises, and on how one chooses the key religious 
differences that sort groups into different categories. Given these 
difficulties, courts generally should not try to single out certain groups as 
religious minorities and treat them differently than other groups. Such an 
approach is too subjective and contestable, in addition to its possible 
inconsistency with the constitutional text. The only defensible method is to 
develop principles for various categories of cases that are applicable to all 
faiths—but that tend to protect whoever happens to be a minority in the 
given geographical location, institution, or cultural atmosphere. The courts 
should not undertake to determine who is a minority in a particular case, 
but should follow rules structurally designed to protect whoever happens 
to be the minority. 
Part III then develops such principles for the leading categories of 
Religion Clause disputes. On many issues I agree with previous 
commentators about the implications of a minority-protection approach. 
To ensure that religious minorities enjoy the right to practice their faith, 
courts should read the Free Exercise Clause expansively and should, in 
some cases, exempt religiously motivated conduct from laws that impose 
significant burdens on the conduct.14 I thus follow other commentators in 
criticizing the Supreme Court’s rejection of exemptions in Smith. And 
 14. See infra Part III.A. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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under a minority-protection approach, the Establishment Clause should be 
vigorously interpreted to restrict government-sponsored religious exercises 
and displays in public schools and other government institutions. Such 
practices by their nature tend to favor the majority religion and impose 
burdens on dissenters; and the strict separationist approach that has 
invalidated these practices is best justified by the rationale of protecting 
religious minorities.15
In other categories, however, I question the common wisdom on what 
will protect minority religions. Most notably, I argue that permitting 
government assistance for religious education and religious social services 
has positive aspects for many religious minorities.16 Thus, the protection 
of minorities does not necessarily point toward the strict “no-aid” version 
of church-state separation. The Court’s increasing trend toward approving 
programs of aid is defensible under a minority-protection approach—at 
least if the program in question includes measures to protect children or 
other beneficiaries from being pushed into schools or social services that 
teach a faith different from their own. 
I. THE MINORITY-PROTECTION APPROACH: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
To begin with, why should the protection and equal status of religious 
minorities be a central concern in Religion Clause cases? There are several 
reasons. 
A. Countermajoritarianism 
The first argument for a minority-protection approach is simple: the 
Constitution, or at least the Bill of Rights, is a countermajoritarian 
document in general, limiting the actions of the politically accountable 
branches. If the rights provisions aim to protect minorities against the 
majority in general, the Religion Clauses aim to protect minorities in 
religious matters. 
Moreover, federal judges, the leading actors in interpreting the 
Constitution, are insulated by lifetime tenure from democratic pressures. 
This independence implies, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 
No. 78, that one of their central tasks is to block “serious oppressions of 
the minority party in the community.”17 In West Virginia State Board of 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. See infra Part III.C. 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/5
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Education v. Barnette18—which itself involved a despised religious 
minority, the Jehovah’s Witnesses—the Supreme Court said that “[t]he 
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials. . . . [Such] fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”19 A 
longtime legal director of the American Jewish Congress, the most active 
Jewish agency litigating Religion Clause cases, explained why his 
organization “relied heavily on the courts for the protection of religious 
liberty”: 
[Jews’] influence with most legislatures is weak, particularly when 
there are countervailing religious pressures. . . . That is not to say 
that judges are not influenced by currents of popular feelings or 
prejudice. But judges, unlike legislators, are guided by a tradition of 
objectivity and independence, a tradition that requires decisions to 
be based on the record . . . .20
The Religion Clauses may be particularly appropriate for a minority-
protection approach. Not only does the Free Exercise Clause protect 
religious exercise against government restrictions; the Establishment 
Clause limits majoritarian government in promoting religious doctrines or 
values. On subjects outside of religion, the Free Speech Clause limits only 
the majority’s ability to restrict individuals’ expression—not the 
majority’s ability to express and promote its own views through the 
government. By contrast, the Religion Clauses set up a unique, double-
barreled limitation on majoritarian acts.21
Majority religions already enjoy de facto protection in various ways, 
since religion is intertwined with culture and moral values. When moral 
and cultural issues enter the political process, representative democracy 
will generally respond to majority religious faiths and values. And outside 
the realm of politics strictly defined, culture will tend to represent widely 
 18. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 19. Id. at 638. 
 20. Will Maslow, The Legal Defense of Religious Liberty—The Strategy and Tactics of the 
American Jewish Congress (1973), reprinted in RELIGION AND STATE IN THE AMERICAN JEWISH 
EXPERIENCE 229, 232–33 (Jonathan D. Sarna & David G. Dalin eds., 1997). 
 21. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (“Speech is [generally] protected by 
ensuring its full expression even when the government participates” but “[i]n religious debate or 
expression the government is not a prime participant . . . . [T]he Establishment Clause is a specific 
prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech 
provisions.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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held faiths and values, which can create a pervasive sense of discomfort 
for minorities. 
Consider, for example, the list of incidents that law professor Stephen 
Feldman recounts from his daily life as a Jew in Tulsa, Oklahoma.22 Well-
meaning neighbors give his newborn daughter a gift, but “[u]nfortunately, 
it was a New Testament.”23 His dental hygienist remarks that his newborn 
son’s name, Samuel Jacob, “sounds so Jewish.”24 His daughter asks if she 
can be a Christian when she grows up, “[s]o I can celebrate Christmas.”25 
He reads of the first President Bush thanking Christian radio executives 
“for helping America, as Christ ordained, to be a light unto the world.”26 
On one December day, his family attends a play that begins with an 
impromptu reading of The Night Before Christmas; then they visit the city 
zoo and find Christmas decorations everywhere and Christmas music 
broadcast throughout the grounds; finally they eat dinner at a restaurant 
covered with Christmas decorations, where his daughter receives a 
drawing of a Christmas stocking to color.27
One might question whether all of these episodes evince a “web of 
power” or “Christian imperialism.”28 The Christmas incidents mostly 
reflect the holiday’s secular focus, which sometimes distresses devout 
Christians as well. Only a few of the acts Professor Feldman describes 
were governmental and thus subject to constitutional limits. Many of the 
private actions were not only legal, but were also probably well-meaning 
and, in any event, impossible to eliminate. In a free society, people will 
celebrate symbols and traditions that they believe are good; and they will 
wish those goods on others, including strangers, with no ill motive. 
Nevertheless, Professor Feldman’s list makes an important point. It 
“communicate[s] . . . the experience of being an outgroup member. . ., the 
experience of cumulative frustration in coping” day after day with the 
actions and assumptions of the majority culture or the majority-elected 
government.29
In addition, minority religions often qualify as the kind of “discrete and 
insular” minority that, under the analysis in footnote four of United States 
 22. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 283–85. Since that time, Professor Feldman has moved from 
the University of Tulsa to the University of Wyoming. 
 23. Id. at 283. 
 24. Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 286. 
 29. Id. at 283. 
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v. Carolene Products,30 should receive special attention from courts 
because the political branches are prone to show prejudice or at least 
indifference to the group’s interests.31 Only two years after the Carolene 
Products footnote, its author, Justice Stone, identified the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses as a prime example of such a minority: one whose practice “is 
such a departure from the usual course of human conduct, that most 
persons are disposed to regard it with little toleration or concern.”32
Religious minorities have certainly faced violent and unreasoning 
prejudice at times in American history. Consider just the phenomenon of 
mob violence. When the new Catholic immigrant population grew in 
Eastern cities in the mid-1800s, nativist Protestant mobs attacked churches 
and burned convents.33 During the same period, mobs in New York and 
the Midwest assaulted Mormons, killed the religion’s founder Joseph 
Smith, and drove the Mormons to seek refuge in unsettled Utah.34 The 
lynching of Leo Frank in Georgia in 1915 was just the most vicious in a 
pattern of anti-Semitic acts in various parts of the nation over several 
decades.35 And as the next section details, Jehovah’s Witnesses suffered 
numerous vigilante attacks across America in the mid-1900s.36 Each of 
these groups has also faced less violent forms of discrimination—legal 
restrictions and harassment, exclusion from jobs, ridicule of their children 
in public schools—in places where they have been a numerical and 
cultural minority.37
Admittedly, one’s religious beliefs and personal worship are not 
immediately visible to others as is one’s race, the classic example of a 
“discrete” characteristic that unavoidably marks one off as an outsider. But 
religious freedom implicates more than beliefs and private worship. 
 30. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 31. Id. at 152 n.4 (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and [thus] may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 32. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 33. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 215–20 (2002); LLOYD 
JORGENSEN, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825–1925, at 78–83 (1987). 
 34. See, e.g., LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A 
HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 44–105 (1979); SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON 
QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (2004). 
 35. See generally LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA (1994) [hereinafter 
DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM]; see also LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); 
MELISSA FAY GREENE, THE TEMPLE BOMBING (1996). 
 36. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 37. See generally DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM supra note 35; ANDREW M. GREELEY, AN UGLY 
LITTLE SECRET: ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN NORTH AMERICA (1977); Feldman, supra note 4, at 236–37; 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (1992). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 919 Berg book pages.doc 3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
928 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religious identity usually means committing as well to a set of outward 
practices, which often are quite visible and singular: wearing a head 
covering, or a beard or long hair, or preaching on the street corner. Such 
practices can be jarring or offensive to the majority and therefore trigger 
discrimination or suppression as responses. Likewise, many religious 
practices insulate or separate the believer from the majority: acts such as 
receiving education in a faith-permeated school or refraining from certain 
foods or activities. Moreover, religious identity is likely to be particularly 
difficult for an individual to shrug off because its demands tend to be all-
encompassing and constitutive of an adherent’s overall identity.38 Indeed, 
the “comprehensiveness” or “comprehensive nature” of a set of beliefs 
forms part of the most common modern judicial definition of “religion.”39
I concede that these features may not always render a religious 
minority “discrete and insular” in the full sense of the term. Some groups 
having minority religious views are relatively diffuse and interact with 
people of other views in society in varying ways. But even if such 
interactions exist and the group is not isolated or oppressed across the 
board, the group can nevertheless have stark conflicts with majoritarian 
legal norms on particular issues or sets of issues. If we care about the 
ability of all religious groups presumptively to practice their faith, then 
even legal restrictions on particular practices—and the majoritarian 
hostility or indifference that these reflect—should be treated as serious 
constitutional matters. 
Recognizing what features make religious minorities subject to 
prejudice—or at least restriction—has implications for just what a 
minority-protection approach should protect. It is obviously important to 
invalidate laws that discriminate against persons based simply on their 
private beliefs or memberships. Because beliefs alone do not directly 
affect others, such laws cannot be justified by social necessity. But 
protection of religious minorities should extend beyond beliefs to a second 
purpose: allowing those minorities that have distinctive ways of practice 
and living to preserve and pursue those where possible, even in the face of 
general societal norms.40 It is an adherent’s outward behavior that can 
make her vulnerable to hostile reactions and suppression by the majority. 
Members of minority religions—like those of majority religions—should 
 38. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Right Not to Be John Garvey, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 775 
(1998) (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1997)). 
 39. See, e.g., Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 
592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). 
 40. See infra Part III.A. 
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be able to carry out their beliefs in practice openly, as long as they do not 
infringe on the rights of others. They should also be able to express their 
beliefs openly to others, again short of infringing on others’ rights or 
privacy. 
I emphasize this point because sometimes proponents of minority 
religious rights seem concerned mostly with protecting the minority from 
state imposition of the majority’s religious views.41 This negative 
conception—protection against being religiously coerced by majoritarian 
government—is important, but by itself it will not necessarily promote the 
full religious freedom of religious minorities. The negative conception 
points logically toward keeping the public sphere wholly secular in its 
content, so that no religious view can be imposed on others. The logic may 
extend even to the point of restricting the religious speech of individual 
citizens in governmental settings like public schools.42 But the matter must 
be approached differently once it is recognized that religious minorities 
also have a positive interest in practicing their faith, or expressing it, in 
governmental settings. A wholly secular public sphere can restrict the 
positive religious exercise of minorities. Analysis of minority religious 
rights must take into account the positive as well as the negative aspects of 
liberty in religious matters.43
To be sure, minority status does not always harm a religious group’s 
political or organizational vitality. For one thing, a group’s size often 
matters far less than its cultural status: some groups that are small in 
numbers nevertheless occupy an elite position in their society, a 
 41. See, for example, infra notes 195–200, 352–57 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 43. The distinction between negative and positive conceptions of minority rights appears in 
historian Naomi Cohen’s description of the posture of Jewish religious freedom agencies in recent 
decades. Through the 1960s, there was “a secularist strand within [the personnel of] the defense 
agencies” that emphasized freeing Jews from having to endure public religious ceremonies; the 
secularist personnel “spoke for a religious community, but . . . their actions in opposition to public 
religion reflected their own indifference if not hostility to religion itself.” NAOMI W. COHEN, JEWS IN 
CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 126 (1992). By the 1970s, however, 
with personnel “more committed to Judaism than their immediate predecessors,” the agencies 
“increasingly affirmed that free exercise included the protection of religious behavior, in diverse and 
multiple forms”: they “coupled the older ‘thou shalt not’ command to government with a ‘thou 
mayest’ nod to both Jewish and non-Jewish minorities.” Id. at 244. 
 The distinction between positive and negative religious liberty has some analogies to the question 
whether America should be understood as a “melting pot” in which various groups merge their 
particularist identities into a general American identity or as a model of “cultural pluralism” in which 
particularist identities remain distinct and are accommodated. For discussion of this question as 
applied to religious identities, see WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA: THE 
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL 186–95 (2003). 
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complication I consider in the next section.44 Moreover, as Bruce 
Ackerman has pointed out, a group’s insularity can actually strengthen its 
political effectiveness—for example by “engender[ing a] group solidarity” 
that encourages efforts on the group’s behalf and by making it “cheaper to 
organize [and communicate with members] for effective political 
action.”45 An example of the political muscle of insular groups can be seen 
in the various Hasidic Jewish sects that wield considerable power in New 
York politics because their adherents “have high voter turn-out rates, . . . 
and frequently vote as a bloc ‘for the candidate selected by the rebbe and 
community leaders.’”46
Dissonance with the broader culture can bolster not only a minority 
group’s political mobilization, but also its general vigor and self-
definition. The minority may embrace its outsider status and use it to 
define the distinct nature and qualities of its community. Among the most 
obvious examples are “sectarian” groups such as the Amish.47 Jews have 
employed such a strategy for hundreds of years. The urban ghettos and 
rural shtetls of pre-1900 Eastern Europe were unquestionably means by 
which the dominant society confined and oppressed Jews. But these 
undeniable burdens also offered some benefits: they helped produce dense 
religious institutions and customs that reinforced Jews’ group identity and 
solidarity in the face of the majority’s hostility.48 Conversely, the political 
emancipation of Jews after the Enlightenment, though certainly an 
advance for Jewish rights in many ways, also brought costs with it: Jews 
were expected to give up many aspects of their communal life with direct 
religious import.49 Some of the communal customs that survived were 
 44. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 45. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–26 (1985); see 
also id. at 728 (“[F]or all our Carolene talk about the powerlessness of insular groups, we are perfectly 
aware of the enormous power such voting blocs have in American politics.”). 
 46. See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 118 (1996) 
(internal quotation omitted). See generally JEROME R. MINTZ, HASIDIC PEOPLE: A PLACE IN THE NEW 
WORLD (1992). 
 47. See, e.g., JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (3d ed. 1980); DONALD B. KRAYBILL, ON 
THE BACK ROAD TO HEAVEN: OLD ORDER HUTTERITES, MENNONITES, AMISH, AND BRETHREN 
(2001). 
 48. See Benny Kraut, Jewish Survival in Protestant America, in MINORITY FAITHS AND THE 
AMERICAN PROTESTANT MAINSTREAM 15, 19–20 (Jonathan D. Sarna ed., 1998). 
 49. “Jews, according to the terms of the emancipation, . . . were to give up the civil aspects of 
Talmudic law; disavow the political implications of Jewish messianism; abandon the use of Yiddish; 
and most importantly, relinquish their semi-autonomous communal institutions.” Vicki Caron, French-
Jewish Assimilation Reassessed: A Review of the Recent Literature, 42 JUDAICA 134, 138 (1993) 
(summarizing SIMON SCHWARZFUCHS, DU JUIF A L’ISRAELITE: HISTOIRE D’UNE MUTATION, 1770–
1879 (1989)).  
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transferred to the urban Jewish enclaves of the New World,50 and current-
day Hasidic groups in New York City and elsewhere maintain many such 
customs.51 Of course a more common response of Jews in America has 
been to assimilate, either to Protestant Christian styles of religious practice 
or to secular American values concerning politics and society.52 But even 
as they have departed from traditional religious customs, many American 
Jews have sought to replace them with some other form of Jewish 
particularity—often through nonreligious ideals such as Zionism or social 
reform, but often through religious forms that combine distinctively 
Jewish with common American ideals.53 The need for particularity is as 
basic as the need to follow common ideals. 
Or consider the posture of one much larger religious body, Protestant 
evangelicals. A recent study of American evangelicalism finds it vigorous, 
“not because it is shielded against, but because it is—or at least perceives 
itself to be—embattled with forces that seem to oppose or threaten it.”54 
Evangelicalism “thrives on distinction, engagement, tension, conflict, and 
threat”55: in particular, on its members’ sense that they are dissenters from 
a dominant culture that has embraced “narcissistic, licentious, and self-
destructive values and lifestyles.”56 Since as far back as the 1920s, 
historians have noted, evangelicals have characterized themselves “as a 
‘beleaguered minority fighting with their backs to the wall.’”57 Without 
such challenges, evangelicalism “would lose its identity and purpose and 
become aimless and languid.”58 The example of evangelicals shows, the 
study concludes, how “[i]ntergroup conflict in a pluralistic context 
typically strengthens in-group identity, solidarity, resources mobilization, 
and membership retention.”59
 50. See Kraut, supra note 48, at 20. 
 51. For description of various communities, see, for example, MINTZ, supra note 46. 
 52. See, e.g., WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT CATHOLIC JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
SOCIOLOGY 191 (rev. ed. 1960) (describing elements in Reform services, such as organ music, mixed 
choir singing, and centrality of sermon, that “obviously reflected the influence of familiar Protestant 
practice”); Kraut, supra note 48, at 22–35. The matter is complicated, of course, because modern 
notions of equality, democracy, and individual freedom are themselves outgrowths, in part, of the 
Hebraic Biblical tradition. 
 53. See, e.g., HERBERG, supra note 52, at 186–95 (describing mid-20th-century Jewish religion 
as “return” of American Jews to Jewishness within the context of “the American pattern of religious 
life”). 
 54. CHRISTIAN SMITH, AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: EMBATTLED AND THRIVING 89 (1998). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 131. 
 57. R. LAWRENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICANS 163 (1985) 
(quoting Interview with Timothy L. Smith, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 19, 1976, at 24). 
 58. SMITH, supra note 54, at 89. 
 59. Id. at 113. 
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These advantages of minority status call for caution about a minority-
protection approach, but they do not undermine it. As I have said, 
protection of minority religions should not be the only consideration under 
the Religion Clauses, but it should be an important one. Even with the 
advantages of minority status, there remain many reasons to be concerned 
about government impositions on religious dissenters. Professor 
Ackerman admits that the strengths he sees in insular minorities depend on 
an assumption: that “however oppressed the [group’s members] may be in 
other respects, they have not been prevented from building up a dense 
communal life for themselves on their tight little island.”60 Strong 
constitutional protection may be necessary to ensure that such communal 
islands can survive. Likewise, the study of evangelicals emphasizes that 
their vitality depends on their not experiencing too much pressure from the 
culture. If a group “becom[es] genuinely countercultural,”61 it may become 
obsessively defensive, unable to act effectively in the broader world—as 
the authors say has happened with Protestant fundamentalists, the more 
separatist cousins of the evangelicals.62 Moreover, although tension with 
the culture can be invigorating, it is crucial that “[o]utright persecution is 
minimized,” that “pluralism does not exterminate evangelicalism.”63 This 
Article and the First Amendment are concerned not with mere tensions 
between a religion and the majority culture, but with legal restrictions and 
impositions on religious activity. And legal restriction and impositions 
raise precisely the potential for persecution that may decimate a minority 
religious group rather than strengthen it. 
B. Constitutional History 
The constitutional history of religious freedom in America also 
suggests the importance of protecting religious minorities. Such protection 
has been central in at least two crucial stages in the development of 
religious freedom. 
1. The Founding Era 
The years around the Constitution’s framing saw widespread agitation 
for religious freedom, most effectively by the Baptists of New England 
 60. Ackerman, supra note 45, at 724–25. 
 61. SMITH, supra note 54, at 118–19 (italics in original omitted). 
 62. Id. at 146. 
 63. Id. at 150. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/5
p 919 Berg book pages.doc 3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] MINORITY RELIGIONS AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 933 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and the South. The Baptists were a distinct minority in Congregationalist-
dominated New England, and although they were more numerous in the 
southern colonies, they stood outside the dominant Anglican culture.64 The 
Baptists were “largely lower class”, they followed exotic worship 
practices, and they angered mainstream citizens with aggressive street 
preaching and “ope[n] disdain[ for] the established religion and gentry 
mores.”65 As a result, the Baptists “were reviled” and “were met with 
violence.”66 The imprisonment of itinerant Baptist preachers in rural 
Virginia in 1774 first impressed on young James Madison the immorality 
of coercion in religious matters.67 The Presbyterians were also outsiders at 
the time, dismissed as “dangerously ‘enthusiastic’ (meaning fanatical) by 
the authorities.”68
Baptists and Presbyterians were key proponents of religious freedom 
and disestablishment at the founding. Aggrieved by the requirement of 
paying taxes to support clergy, they provided the largest number of votes 
in Virginia to defeat the proposed tax assessment for religious teaching in 
1785.69 Baptist leaders, such as Isaac Backus in Massachusetts and John 
Leland in Virginia, took the lead in calling for an amendment guaranteeing 
religious freedom against the federal government.70 Their voting power in 
James Madison’s congressional district undoubtedly helped prod Madison 
to introduce what became the First Amendment.71 The original 
 64. See, e.g., ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA 1776–1990, at 29 
tbl.2.3 (1992) (noting that Baptists made up 15 percent of religious congregations in New England in 
1776 compared with Congregationalists’ 63 percent); id. (noting that Baptists and Anglicans each 
made up 28 percent of congregations in southern colonies). Not until after the revivals of 1800 to 1830 
did Baptists become a culturally mainstream—and in the South, a numerically and culturally 
dominant—group. See, e.g., NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN 
CHRISTIANITY 3–4, 93–95, 204–07 (1989); CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN, SOUTHERN CROSS: THE 
BEGINNINGS OF THE BIBLE BELT 189, 236–47 (1997) (detailing transformation of evangelicals in 
South from outsider status to numerical and cultural dominance). 
 65. “[T]hey were at first largely lower class; . . . their worship sometimes caused their members 
to cry, bark like dogs, tremble, jerk, and fall to the ground; . . . and . . . as one Virginian charged, ‘they 
cannot meet a man on the road but they must ram a text of Scripture down his throat.’” J. LEWIS, THE 
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: FAMILY AND VALUES IN JEFFERSON’S VIRGINIA 49 (1987), quoted in Michael 
W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1409, 1438 (1990). 
 66. McConnell, supra note 65, at 1438; see also WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: 
THE BAPTISTS’ STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND 1630–1833, at 196–227 (1991) (describing mob violence 
against Baptists in Massachusetts in late 1770s and early 1780s). 
 67. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 104, 106 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1977). 
 68. McConnell, supra note 65, at 1438. 
 69. Id. at 1439–40. 
 70. See id. at 1476 & n.333 (quoting Leland); William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the 
Separation of Church and State in America, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 1392 (1968) (discussing Backus). 
 71. “On advice of his political adviser,” Madison, who was running for Congress in 1789, 
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understanding of the Religion Clauses is a complicated matter, but the 
clauses grew in significant part out of a concern that the new federal 
government might impose on religious minorities. During the 
congressional debates, Madison explained that his proposal was based on 
the fear not only that one single sect “might obtain pre-eminence,” but also 
that “two [might] combine together, and establish a religion to which they 
would compel others,” presumably thereby the minority, “to conform.”72
2. The Origins of Modern Religion Clause Jurisprudence 
The Religion Clauses began to assume their prominent modern role in 
the 1940s when the Supreme Court applied the clauses to the vast range of 
state and local actions. This step came first in situations involving the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, a despised religious minority. The Witnesses were 
then a relatively small sect—approximately 40,000 members in America 
in 1940, many scattered in small groups around the nation73—preaching 
the message of a coming kingdom of God. Even more than the founding-
era Baptists, the Witnesses triggered intense public hostility because of 
their aggressive and loud street-corner and door-to-door preaching, their 
dogmatic attacks on other faiths, and their unpopular stands such as 
refusing to salute the flag or serve in the military.74 Jehovah’s Witnesses 
across the nation faced firing from their jobs, arrests by the police, 
destruction of their meeting halls, and beatings from local vigilantes.75 The 
violence escalated after the Supreme Court held in June 1940 that public 
schools could require Witness children to salute the flag as a means of 
fostering “the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.”76 Observers of the day 
concluded that the Gobitis decision served, even if by misinterpretation, 
“to kindle mob violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses.”77 As already noted, 
Justice Stone, dissenting in Gobitis, recognized the Witnesses as a prime 
contacted Baptist leaders and eventually “championed a constitutional provision for religious liberty as 
a campaign issue. The Baptist leaders responded by giving him their electoral support, which 
contributed to his narrow margin of victory.” McConnell, supra note 65, at 1477. He kept his promise 
by introducing the proposal that became the First Amendment. 
 72. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 731 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 73. SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND 
THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 30 (2000). 
 74. For accounts of the Witnesses’ evangelistic campaigns and the hostile and often violent 
public responses, see, for example, DAVID MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE 
CONTROVERSY (1962); PETERS, supra note 73. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597 (1940). 
 77. PETERS, supra note 73, at 84 (quoting Beulah Amidon, Can We Afford Martyrs?, SURVEY 
GRAPHIC, Sept. 1940, at 457, 460) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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example of the discrete and insular minorities who needed protection 
under the logic of his Carolene Products footnote.78
When the justices switched three years later in Barnette and upheld a 
child’s right to refuse the flag salute,79 they likely reacted to the wave of 
violence that had followed Gobitis, even though a number of references in 
early drafts to the violence were removed by the time the Barnette opinion 
issued.80 The Witnesses’ experience provided the classic modern lesson 
that majorities cannot be trusted to tolerate minorities with infuriating 
beliefs and practices, and that courts must play a significant role in 
ensuring legal protection. 
The Jehovah’s Witness cases laid the foundation for the modern law of 
freedom of speech and religion, beginning with the incorporation of the 
Free Exercise Clause in Cantwell v. Connecticut.81 Other decisions 
involving the Witnesses identified religious expression and practice as a 
“preferred freedom” and introduced a now familiar array of protective 
devices: forbidding the state to regulate speech because of its message,82 
distinguishing between “peaceable” and unpeaceable behavior,83 requiring 
a truly “clear and present danger” of public disorder to justify restriction of 
speech,84 and demanding that regulation be “narrowly drawn” and precise 
in its terms.85
The modern Court’s approach to religious freedom was influenced by 
the experiences and activities of another prominent religious minority, 
Jews. The full horror of the Holocaust did not deeply affect Americans 
until well after World War II,86 but even during the war people clearly 
knew that the Axis powers mistreated Jews and other minorities. Some of 
the Justices may have concluded that it was crucial to protect Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and other minorities precisely in order to reaffirm the difference 
between America and its dictator enemies.87
 78. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 79. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 80. See PETERS, supra note 73, at 251. 
 81. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 82. Id. at 308. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 311. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Clear and Present Danger Test, 25 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 161 (2000). 
 85. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116–17 (1943); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311. 
 86. See generally PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (2000). 
 87. For example, Justice Murphy, the Court’s strongest proponent of the Witnesses’ rights, wrote 
a draft dissent in Gobitis emphasizing that First Amendment protections were vital “[e]specially at this 
time when the freedom of individual conscience is being placed in jeopardy by world shaking events.” 
PETERS, supra note 73, at 65–66 (quoting SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 
185–90 (1984)). Although he ended up joining the Gobitis majority, he quickly switched to voting on 
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Whatever the Justices’ attitudes toward Jews as a minority, the major 
Jewish organizations played a central role in the development of 
constitutional church-state doctrine after World War II. Led by the 
American Jewish Congress—and imitating civil rights agencies like the 
ACLU and the NAACP—the Jewish bodies initiated and financed 
“planned, strategic litigation”88 to challenge religious programs in public 
schools and other government actions that pressured Jews as a religious 
minority.89 Jews developed wide consensus that strict church-state 
separation, with an active enforcement role by courts, was necessary to 
protect their equal status against the Christian majority. The AJCongress’s 
remarkable church-state counsel, Leo Pfeffer, led the way, as advocate and 
scholar, in crafting arguments for strict separationism. Pfeffer argued more 
religion cases in the Supreme Court than anyone in history—including, by 
the 1970s, several decisions invoking strong church-state separation to 
strike down government aid to parochial schools.90 Indeed, strict 
separationism and the Court’s pre-1980s doctrine have sometimes been 
referred to (mostly by critics) as the “Pfefferian” approach.91
The leading Jewish organizations likely had an effect on the Court 
when it began constructing Religion Clause doctrine in the mid-1900s. 
The Jewish organizations presented an articulate account from a prominent 
and credible group of why the religious freedom of minorities demanded a 
strong separation of church and state enforced by an active judiciary. 
the Witnesses’ side. See also MANWARING, supra note 74, at 158 (quoting Christian Science Monitor 
article after Gobitis warning that “in excited times a great deal may be done under the name of general 
welfare, which leads in the direction of State religion, or State irreligion as in Nazi Germany or Soviet 
Russia”). 
 88. GREGG IVERS, TO BUILD A WALL: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE 53 (1995). 
 89. For accounts of the litigation and other strategies of the major Jewish defense organizations, 
see, for example, COHEN, supra note 43, at 131–213; IVERS, supra note 88. 
 90. IVERS, supra note 88, at 184–85 (noting Pfeffer’s role as lead counsel in cases striking down 
school aid); Leo Pfeffer: Apostle of Strict Separationism, in RELIGION AND STATE IN THE AMERICAN 
JEWISH EXPERIENCE 233 (Jonathan D. Sarna & David G. Dalin eds., 1997). On Pfeffer’s life, see LEO 
PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT (1984) (autobiographical introduction by 
Pfeffer); Thomas C. Berg, Leo Pfeffer, in THE OXFORD AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (John A. 
Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999). 
 91. See, e.g., Richard J. Neuhaus, Contending for the Future: Overcoming the Pfefferian 
Inversion, 8 J. L. & RELIG. 115, 118 (1990); see also ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 15 (1982) (describing the “Pfeffer school of 
thought”). 
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C. Minority Protection as a Foundation for Strict Separationism 
The minority-protection emphasis not only is associated with the 
principle of strict church-state separation, it may well be indispensable to 
that principle. Strict separationism today stands in serious need of a 
normative rationale. Even commentators sympathetic to the approach have 
criticized its traditional formulations for relying too heavily on slogans, 
catch phrases, and abstract manipulable tests divorced from underlying 
values and purposes.92 Strict separationism has also been criticized for 
giving courts too much power and restricting the political branches too 
severely.93
If there is a convincing normative rationale for strict separationism 
enforced by an active judiciary, protection of minority religions is a likely 
candidate. The argument is that democratic government will likely reflect 
and favor majority religious values, and therefore the further that 
government keeps from religion, the better for minority faiths. “[T]he wall 
of separation . . . is viewed by members of religious minorities as a 
safeguard against practices which tend to favor those majority religious 
faiths that have the political power to enact laws for their own benefit.”94 
Prayers or other religious exercises chosen by the government will reflect 
the religious view of the majority and will impose pressure, subtle or 
overt, on those who dissent from that general sentiment. Therefore, the 
argument goes, government ought scrupulously to refrain from sponsoring 
religious ceremonies and expression.95 Government funding of religious 
schools, it is argued, should be limited because it will disproportionately 
benefit those denominational schools whose views are close to the 
majority’s, and will disfavor those faiths that are too small to operate their 
 92. Brownstein, supra note 1, at 887 (arguing that “traditional separationist doctrine is 
sometimes unpersuasive because it resolves cases solely in terms of mega principles and rules” and 
fails “to explain how and why ostensibly modest connections between government and religion 
realistically risk the undermining of religious liberty”); Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal 
Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 1111, 1118 (2002) (noting that separation “has always lacked a coherent definition”); see also Ira 
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of 
Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 951 (2003) (arguing that justices who oppose all 
school voucher schemes are “mired in now-antiquated and unpersuasive theories of church-state 
separation”). 
 93. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing separationist decisions of 1960s and 70s for creating a “Scylla 
and Charybdis” that few legislative actions could survive). 
 94. Levinson, supra note 4, at 52. 
 95. For a closer evaluation of such arguments, see infra Part III.B. 
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own school systems.96 Conversely, strict separationism, at least 
historically, has affirmed strong protection for the free exercise rights of 
adherents, a principle especially important for minority faiths.97
Notwithstanding these arguments, there have been counterarguments 
that strict separationism does not necessarily protect the interests of 
minority religions. For example, although most American Jews have 
supported strict separation,98 some strong voices have claimed that the 
approach produces a secularized public square that is ultimately negative 
for Jews and other religious minorities.99 These critics have claimed that 
Jews, as a group “with whom religion has traditionally been conceived as 
coterminous with life,” should not promote an approach that separates 
religion from matters of public life such as education.100 The critics have 
objected that strict separation denies state assistance to the Jewish 
religious day schools that constitute the best “source of Jewish identity for 
Jewish children in America.”101 Critics have also argued that basic 
monotheistic principles should receive endorsement from government 
because they form an essential foundation for the very principles of 
freedom and toleration that protect religious minorities.102
 96. See infra Part III.C. 
 97. As one leading separationism proponent puts it, “[p]ursuant to the [1970s] ‘separationist’ 
holdings, churches and religious organizations were left alone to determine their own beliefs and 
governance, were accommodated in their practices, and were exempted from taxation and intrusive 
regulation.” Green, supra note 92, at 1112. As Douglas Laycock has noted, however, there is a strand 
of thought that “call[s] itself separationist” but nevertheless opposes any distinctive autonomy for 
religious exercise; “its defining commitment seems to be to secular supremacy and religious 
subordination, or at least to religious marginalization.” Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of 
Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 47 (1997). 
 98. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Sarna, Church-State Dilemma of American Jews, in JEWS AND THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: DEBATING RELIGION AND REPUBLIC 47, 57 (Alan Mittelman et al. eds., 
2002) [hereinafter JEWS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE]; Jack Wertheimer, The Jewish Debate 
Over State Aid to Religious Schools, in JEWS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra, at 217. 
 99. See, e.g., ELLIOTT ABRAMS, FAITH OR FEAR: HOW JEWS CAN SURVIVE IN CHRISTIAN 
AMERICA (1997); AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH: THE NEW DEBATE ON RELIGION 
IN PUBLIC LIFE (David G. Dalin ed., 1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST 
FAITH]; Will Herberg, The Sectarian Controversy over Church and State: A Divisive Threat to Our 
Democracy?, reprinted in WILL HERBERG, FROM MARXISM TO JUDAISM: THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF 
WILL HERBERG 187 (David G. Dalin ed., 1989). 
 100. Herberg, supra note 99, at 208; see also Jerold S. Auerbach, in AMERICAN JEWS AND THE 
SEPARATIONIST FAITH, supra note 99, at 15, 17 (describing separationism as a “form of Jewish self-
denial whose primary function is to separate religion from life, precisely contrary to Jewish teaching”). 
 101. David Novak, in AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH, supra note 99, at 93, 94; 
see also Herberg, supra note 99, at 206–07; infra notes 377–78 and accompanying text (describing 
arguments of Orthodox groups in favor of government aid for religious schools). 
 102. Will Herberg, Religion and Public Life, reprinted in HERBERG, supra note 99, at 215, 217; 
see also COHEN, supra note 43, at 182 (noting critics’ argument that “Jewish history, particularly 
persecution at the hands of Nazis and Communists, taught that Jews fared best in ‘God-fearing’ 
nations”). See generally infra Part III.B.2, notes 325–50 and accompanying text. 
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Part III explores such debates as they apply to particular areas of 
Religion Clause jurisprudence. In some respects, I argue, the traditional 
association of minority rights with strict church-state separationism makes 
logical and empirical sense. But I also argue that in some situations, such 
as aid to private religious schools, it is far less clear that strict 
separationism on balance protects religious minorities: it may even hamper 
them. 
II. DIFFICULTIES AND COMPLICATIONS IN THE MINORITY-PROTECTION 
APPROACH 
Despite the above reasons for making the protection of minority 
religions a central theme of the Religion Clauses, this approach also 
presents difficulties and complications. 
A. The First Amendment Protects All Religions 
The most obvious difficulty is that the First Amendment protects all 
faiths, not just minorities. The unqualified term “religion” in the text 
contains no suggestion of a difference between faiths—as if only minority 
faiths had a right to free exercise, and only majority faiths were barred 
from being state-established. Although religious freedom is certainly 
concerned with minorities, it is fundamentally a substantive liberty 
possessed by people of all faiths. Indeed, if courts adopted a rule explicitly 
protecting minority religions alone, or more than larger faiths, this would 
itself fly in the face of the deeply ingrained principle that government 
should treat all religions equally. In striking down a law that facially 
regulated solicitations by some faiths but not others, the Court said that 
equal treatment among religions is “the clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause.”103
The response might be that a minority-protection approach aims for 
equality—but in substantial effect rather than in formal terms. Majority 
faiths already enjoy advantages from the background legal and cultural 
arrangements, as I argued earlier.104 Facially equal constitutional rules may 
simply ratify those preexisting advantages, while special rules for minority 
faiths might work to equalize the situation in reality. 
This response invokes an analogy to affirmative action programs for 
racial minorities. Notwithstanding the general presumption against racial 
 103. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1982). 
 104. See supra Part I.A, notes 22–29 and accompanying text. 
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classifications under the Equal Protection Clause,105 limited race-
conscious measures may be justified if they redress past discrimination 
against such minorities or seek to ensure a diversity of voices in 
educational institutions or legislative bodies.106 Similarly, different 
Religion Clause rules could apply to minority faiths based on the 
analogous goal of rectifying the ways in which facially equal rules exclude 
minority faiths or leave them worse off than majorities. David Steinberg 
has drawn the analogy with respect to exemptions from laws that burden 
the free exercise of religion: “[J]ust as elected officials may adopt 
affirmative action programs, the government should be allowed to adopt 
religious exemptions that accommodate members of minority religions.”107 
In contrast, “[p]opular religions burdened by a statute or an agency rule 
should not receive such a religious exemption” but should instead seek to 
repeal the law altogether.108
This approach, however, has serious flaws. Any rule that explicitly 
gives large or “popular” faiths lesser or no free exercise rights contradicts 
the First Amendment’s text and the moral principle of equal liberty for all 
faiths. Steinberg’s proposal would refuse legal protection by exemption—
whether from courts or legislatures—to any “popular” religious group. A 
Catholic diocese would have no constitutional claim if a state 
antidiscrimination law were applied to require it to accept hiring female 
priests; indeed, Catholics could not even seek or invoke legislative relief 
in the form of a statutory exemption for clergy. But a smaller or 
“unpopular” group with a male-only clergy could raise the constitutional 
claim or invoke the statutory exemption. Steinberg acknowledges that 
such a rule “might seem terribly unfair” to mainstream faiths.109 To return 
to the race analogy: although the Court has permitted some race-conscious 
measures to benefit minorities, it has insisted that such measures satisfy 
strict scrutiny, the same standard governing measures favoring the white 
majority.110 The Court has followed Justice Powell’s argument in his 
decisive plurality opinion in Regents of University of California v. 
 105. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989). 
 106. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding some race consciousness in higher-
education admissions for purpose of ensuring diversity of student body); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 
234 (2001) (upholding some race-consciousness in legislative districting). 
 107. David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 120 
(1991). 
 108. Id. at 121. Although this passage speaks of exemptions being “allowed,” the proposal 
actually mandates minority-faith exemptions in many cases. 
 109. Id. at 118. 
 110. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–71 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326–27; Croson, 488 
U.S. at 493. 
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Bakke:111 “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when 
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color.”112 Similarly, persons of minority faiths cannot be governed 
by different First Amendment rules than persons of other faiths. 
Even so, a minority-protection approach may be defensible in a 
different form. Although the same rule must apply to all faiths, the initial 
choice of that rule can be informed by the importance of protecting 
minority faiths. We cannot have a constitutional rule that schools run by 
minority faiths may receive government financial assistance while others 
may not; but in deciding whether religious schools in general may receive 
funds, we can inquire whether minorities will be better protected overall if 
funding is permitted or is forbidden. Part III follows this approach in 
developing rules for various categories of Religion Clause disputes. 
Even with this refinement, I still agree that the goal of the Religion 
Clauses should not be reduced simply to protecting or equalizing minority 
religions. The clauses embody other values: free exercise rights for all 
faiths; equality of status between religious and nonreligious citizens; 
recognition of the relevance of religion to public life; and others. In 
various contexts, these other considerations may collide with the interests, 
preferences, and comfort of religious minorities—as I will note from time 
to time in Part III.113 Nevertheless, for the reasons I have given, the 
protection of minority faiths should remain a significant consideration, and 
it can be helpful to isolate that consideration and analyze its implications, 
leaving aside for the moment other principles that might conflict with it. 
Therefore, this Article concentrates on the arguments and conclusions that 
follow from the minority-protection approach, even though that should not 
be the only emphasis in interpreting the Religion Clauses. 
B. Problems in Defining Religious “Minorities” 
Even if it is legitimate to have constitutional principles that specially 
aim to protect religious minorities, there remains another difficulty: how to 
define who is a “minority.” It may seem simple to identify certain faiths as 
majorities or insiders—Christians, for example—and others as minorities 
 111. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 112. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (opinion of Powell, J.)); see 
also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–72 (following Powell’s analysis); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322–24 (following 
Powell’s analysis). 
 113. See, e.g., infra text following note 366 (noting that religious speech by individual at school 
event may be protected speech even though it causes discomfort to dissenters who have to listen to it). 
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or outsiders—Jews, for example. But in fact, the matter is often 
complicated. 
Consider again the issue of race-conscious measures to benefit racial 
minorities and Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in Bakke. In another 
passage, Powell argued that “varying the level of judicial review according 
to a perceived ‘preferred’ status of a particular racial or ethnic minority”114 
would raise “intractable” problems: 
The concepts of “majority” and “minority” necessarily reflect 
temporary arrangements and political judgments . . . [T]he white 
“majority” itself is composed of various minority groups, most of 
which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands 
of the State and private individuals. . . . There is no principled basis 
for deciding which groups would merit “heightened judicial 
solicitude” and which would not. Courts would be asked to evaluate 
the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various 
minority groups. . . . The kind of variable sociological and political 
analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie 
within the judicial competence.115
Powell added that 
[d]isparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may 
serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than 
alleviate them. Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, 
based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the 
chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one 
generation to the next, a critical feature of its coherent 
interpretation. In expounding the Constitution, the Court’s role is to 
discern “principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots 
throughout the community and continuity over significant periods 
of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political 
judgments of a particular time and place.116
The definition problems that Justice Powell described also complicate, 
perhaps even more seriously, the effort to develop different rules and 
 114. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 115. Id. at 295–97 (citations omitted). 
 116. Id. at 298–99 (citations omitted) (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)). For a later critique based on somewhat similar 
arguments, see Viet Dinh, Races, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1998) (arguing that 
current biracial classifications are inadequate to analyze the problems of multiracial individuals in a 
multiracial nation). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/5
p 919 Berg book pages.doc 3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] MINORITY RELIGIONS AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
special protections for minority religious groups. The difficulties fall into 
several categories. 
1. Geographic Differences 
First, whether a particular religious group constitutes a minority may 
vary according to geographic location. In the complex patchwork of 
religious identities in America, a group that is marginal in one region may 
dominate in another. Indeed, in Federalist No. 10, James Madison relied 
on the diversity of localized majorities, including religious majorities, to 
argue that a single faction would find it difficult to gain preeminence 
across the nation.117 As one prominent study of American religion puts it, 
“[g]eography is [d]estiny”118: there are substantial “regional differences in 
religious preferences.”119 Consider, for example, how the status of 
Mormons varies by region. They obviously constitute the dominant faith 
in Utah and a few other parts of the West.120 But almost everywhere else in 
the nation, they are a small minority,121 vulnerable to religious 
discrimination.122
 117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351–52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The degree of security 
in both cases [civil rights and religious rights] will depend on the number of interests and sects; and 
this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under 
the same government.”). 
 118. BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY ch.3 (1993). 
 119. Id. at 50. 
 120. In 2000, Mormons made up 66.4 percent of Utah’s population and 88.9 percent of its 
religious adherents. See RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000, 
at 38–39 (Dale E. Jones et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS]. They also 
constituted the largest religious group in about 50 other counties in Idaho and the Pacific Northwest. 
Id. at 547 (maps). 
 121. Id. at 6–13. Outside of the Mountain West, Mormons make up at most 1.9 percent of the 
population and generally less than one percent. Id. at 6–13 tbl.2 (Religious Congregations by Region 
and Group). 
 122. For example, a study showed that around most of the nation, Mormon churches, like those of 
other minority groups, have disputes with zoning authorities at a significantly higher rate than their 
proportion in the overall population. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints at 5a–6a, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074), available at 1997 WL 
10290 (noting that Mormons make up 1.4 percent of population nationwide but had nearly double that 
percent of zoning disputes). 
 Fred Gedicks has pointed out, in conversation, that a group that is marginal in one locality may 
nevertheless benefit from its numbers and power nationally or in other localities. For example, when 
Mormons face discrimination in the Southeast, they (unlike, say, Sikhs) can call on a national group of 
Mormon Church lawyers to assist in defending them. This limits my argument but does not defeat it. A 
locally small or unfamiliar group will still lack direct electoral influence on local officials. National 
lawyers can mount defenses, but that ability depends significantly on whether they have constitutional 
or other legal arguments to raise. Thus Religion Clause doctrine should protect these groups as well. 
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To take another example, evangelical Protestant Christians dominate 
numerically and culturally throughout much of the South and the rural 
Midwest.123 In these areas, evangelically minded officials in public schools 
sometimes impose dramatically on religious dissenters—as when Jewish 
students in rural Alabama were required to attend an in-school “birthday 
party” for Jesus, bow their heads during prayer at school assemblies, and 
write an essay on “Why Jesus loves me.”124 There are reported instances of 
evangelical student religious clubs receiving favored treatment from the 
school in ostensibly neutral student club programs. For example, in one 
Oklahoma grade school, the student Christian club, though not formally 
school sponsored, was the only organization that met before classes.125 
When students arrived on buses in the morning, only those attending the 
religious club were permitted to enter the building; others waited outside, 
or in bad weather in the gym or cafeteria.126 The school’s favoritism in 
practice pressured students to join the group. In these and other cases, 
objecting students have faced peer stigmatization at best, and official 
harassment and abuse at worst. In the Oklahoma case, children who 
complained about the arrangements for the Christian club were called 
“devil-worshipers” by other students; two complaining children who had 
played school sports were omitted from recognition by school officials at 
the annual sports banquet; one child “was the victim of a hair pulling 
incident committed by a school employee”; and the family’s home “was 
destroyed by a fire of suspicious origin.”127
 123. In thirteen states of the former Confederacy (including Kentucky and Missouri) as of 1990, 
Baptists—who are largely evangelical in orientation in the South—ranged from 29 to 55 percent of the 
population. KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 119, at 52 map 1A; id. at 88–89 tbl.3-1. Baptists, of 
course, make up only a part of the overall coalition of evangelical Protestants. 
 124. Sue Ann Pressly, Tough Lessons in an Alabama Town; Jewish Children Persecuted at 
School, Parents Charge in Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Sep. 2, 1997, at A3 (detailing allegations, never 
controverted, in lawsuit eventually settled). 
 125. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1405 & n.13 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 126. See id. at 1405, n. 13. 
 127. Id. at 1397. Likewise, in the Alabama case, it was alleged that “[the children] have been 
taunted as ‘Jewish jokers’ and ‘Jew boys’; swastikas have been drawn on their lockers, book bags and 
jackets; and their yarmulkes have been ripped from their heads during High Holy Days, as classmates 
played ‘keep away’ with them.” Pressly, supra note 124, at A3. In Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), where Mormon and Catholic families challenged a Texas school 
district’s policy of prayer by an elected student before football games, “[t]he District Court permitted 
[the plaintiffs] to litigate anonymously to protect them from intimidation or harassment.” Id. at 294. 
For further evidence of the harassment of dissenters in official-prayer cases, see, for example, Frank S. 
Ravitch, A Crack in the Wall: Pluralism, Prayer, and Pain in the Public Schools, in LAW & RELIGION: 
A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 296, 298–303 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). 
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But by contrast, evangelical Protestants scarcely dominate in an area 
such as, say, metropolitan New York.128 New York public school officials 
have repeatedly tried, with backing from courts, to exclude evangelical 
groups from meeting in the schools on the same terms as other voluntary 
groups.129 Most of the cases involved no indication that the evangelicals 
would dominate the forum or coerce other students.130 In each case, the 
restrictive position of the schools and lower courts was overturned as 
discriminatory by the Supreme Court.131 The New York officials were 
nearly as recalcitrant in restricting evangelicals as Southern officials have 
been suppressing dissenters in their communities.132
One is tempted to recommend that student religious clubs be treated 
with suspicion in the rural South but highly protected in New York. But 
we cannot have explicitly divergent rules: as Justice Powell pointed out in 
Bakke, constitutional doctrine must stand above “the pragmatic political 
judgments of a particular time and place”133 and, at least in some form, 
must be uniform across the nation. It is a challenge to develop a set of 
rules that will maximize the protection of religious minorities across the 
wide variety of America’s religious contexts.134
 128. According to statistics, New York is not highly irreligious, but more than almost any other 
major city, its makeup is non-Protestant and especially non-evangelical, with relatively large 
percentages of Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 
119, at 75–76. 
 129. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), 
aff’d, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding school policy forbidding religious meeting of 
elementary-school students in classrooms after school on same terms as other groups), rev’d, 533 U.S. 
98 (2001); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, No. 95 Civ. 5501 (LAP), 1996 WL 
700915 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding school policy barring 
church from applying to use classrooms on weekends for services on same terms as other groups); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 381 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (upholding school policy forbidding church group to meet in classrooms after hours on 
same terms as other community groups), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 487 F. 
Supp. 1219 (N.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a school may and even must 
forbid evangelical student religious club to meet in high school classroom before hours). 
 130. The possible exception is Good News Club, where the dissent cited evidence that only four 
other outside groups had met in the school, and the religious club was the only one meeting 
immediately after school in classrooms. 533 U.S. at 144–45 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 131. The exclusion of high-school religious groups in Brandon was effectively reversed in Board 
of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the Equal Access Act. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–
4074). The Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club exclusions were directly reversed by the Supreme 
Court. See supra note 129. The Bronx Household of Faith exclusion fell as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Good News Club. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 
F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 132. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 n.3 (noting the “remarkable” fact that the Second 
Circuit did not cite the earlier Lamb’s Chapel ruling “despite its obvious relevance to the case”). 
 133. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. 
 134. Professor Schragger questions the contention that “local political institutions are often hostile 
to religious minorities and therefore particularly in need of central oversight—judicial or otherwise,” 
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2. Numerical Minority, Cultural Power 
To add to the complications, geographical numbers do not tell the 
whole story of whether a group is vulnerable to political or legal pressure. 
For one thing, a group may be small and still have power as a political or 
cultural elite. The Episcopal Church, for example, makes up only 0.8 
percent of the total population,135 but it can claim roughly one quarter of 
the nation’s 42 presidents (including two of the last six),136 30 of its 114 
Supreme Court justices (two or three on the current Court),137 and 13 of 
the 100 senators as of 1999.138 Few would suggest that Episcopalians are 
especially vulnerable to coercion by law or pressure by the culture. For an 
accurate map of vulnerable faiths, the majority-minority distinction needs 
to be supplemented and qualified by a distinction between political, social, 
or cultural “insiders” and “outsiders.” But the latter distinction is far less 
objective than are the simple membership statistics. The insider/outsider 
distinction is much more like “the variable sociological and political 
and instead “argues that local government—and more generally the decentralization of power—is a 
robust structural component of religious liberty.” Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the 
Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1815 (2004). I have at least 
two problems with this analysis as applied to the protection of religious minorities. First, I do not 
believe that Professor Schragger rebuts the Madisonian argument that oppressive factions on religious 
matters form more easily at smaller levels of government. See supra note 117. The evidence of local 
treatment of various groups—oppression of Jews or atheists in the rural South, hostility toward serious 
evangelicals in schools in parts of the urban Northeast—indicates that Madison’s insight remains 
valid. See supra notes 120–32; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 526–28 (1993) (describing local hostility in south Florida toward Santeria sect). By contrast, 
we have not seen legislation or policies attacking small religious groups emerge from Congress; 
indeed, much of Congress’s recent activity in the area of religion, such as the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2000), has sought to protect minority faiths, has 
done so through across the board standards applicable to all faiths, and has left room for governmental 
interests to limit religious freedom where necessary. For a policy defense of RFRA and similar laws as 
a “moderate” approach to religious freedom issues, see Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on 
Religious Freedom Legislation, And Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 417–32 (1999). 
 Second, when the article argues that “dispersal of political authority . . . guard[s] against 
governmental overreaching”, I believe that it underestimates the costs of hostility to small groups in a 
particular locality. See Schragger, supra, at 1815. A group whose practice is substantially restricted by 
local laws may be able to avoid them, but only by “migrat[ing] to some other and more tolerant 
region.” See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). The First Amendment’s solution is to 
protect religious adherents’ ability to live as a minority in a locality, not their ability to uproot and 
move somewhere more in line with their religious practices. 
 135. RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS, supra note 120, at tbl.1 (Religious Congregations by Group for 
the United States). 
 136. Religious Affiliation of U.S. Presidents, at http://www.adherents.com/adh_presidents.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (listing 11 Episcopalian presidents, including Ford and the first Bush). 
 137. See William G. Ross, Supreme Court Justices and Their Religious Beliefs, in RELIGION AND 
AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 495, 495 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000). 
 138. See Religious Affiliation of 106th Congress, at http://www.adherents.com/adh_congress.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2004). 
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analysis” that Justice Powell warned falls outside the judicial 
competence.139
Moreover, a group may have numerical or cultural power in some 
institutional sectors of society and lack such power in other sectors. 
Therefore, the sector in which the particular religious freedom issue arises 
can be crucial. For example, often a state university reflects a very 
different culture and power alignment than does the overall state in which 
it is located. Traditionalist Christian beliefs on theological and social 
matters, from Biblical literalism to the creation-evolution debate to the 
immorality of homosexuality, are widespread in many states in the South 
and Midwest. But such views are the decided minority among faculty and 
administrators in higher education.140
Such patterns of belief appear not only statistically in polls, but 
anecdotally in reported cases. Nebraska’s overall population may include a 
high percentage of conservative Protestants,141 but that did not help 
Douglas Rader, an evangelical student at a state university campus who 
complained about the University’s requirement that he live in a dormitory 
as a freshman.142 When Rader asked permission to live in an 
evangelically-oriented rooming house because the dorms’ permissive 
atmosphere on sex and drinking interfered with his faith, officials replied 
that the evangelical house lacked the “diversity of thought” that the 
University desired, and that students with religious objections to the dorms 
should simply not attend the University.143 Likewise, even though most 
Alabamians likely believe in divine creation rather than evolution, a 
University of Alabama physiology professor was sanctioned by his 
department for introducing creationist ideas in his classes.144 And even 
though Mormons predominate in Utah, a Mormon drama student at the 
University of Utah who objected to repeating profanities in a play was 
denied an accommodation by her professor, who remarked that she should 
 139. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978). 
 140. See, e.g., Fred Thalheimer, Religiosity and Secularization in the Academic Professions, 46 
SOC. OF EDUC. 183, 184 (1973) (“[T]here is strong evidence . . . that adherence to traditional religious 
beliefs and practices is considerably less widespread among academicians than among the general 
population.”). 
 141. See KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 119, at 51 (citing religious-affiliation statistics, 
describing Nebraska as “a Republican, patriotic, God-fearing, socially conservative middle-American 
state with traditionally defined male and female roles and a belief in the validity of old-fashioned 
family values”). 
 142. Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1554 n.26 (D. Neb. 1996). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding University’s discretion to 
prohibit such remarks). 
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speak with “other good Mormon girls” on how to reconcile her beliefs 
with the demands made of actors.145 This apparent sarcasm, coupled with 
the drama department’s willingness to accommodate other student 
requests, led the Tenth Circuit to find a genuine issue of fact about 
whether the department acted out of “anti-Mormon sentiment.”146
My point here is not that university officials acted out of religious 
bigotry in these particular cases (although they may well have). I raise the 
cases only to confirm that sometimes religious views common in the 
general population are, in the eyes of academic officials, unfamiliar, 
unattractive, and even worthy of restriction. A majority view in the 
broader culture may be a minority in the government institution acting in 
the particular case. 
3. Defining the Relevant Competing Faiths 
Finally, the determination of which is a minority or outsider faith 
depends on a prior determination of how to define and categorize religious 
groups. What are the relevant “faiths”? The answer is not always self-
evident, as the case of evangelicals again shows. As Steven Smith points 
out, if evangelicals are lumped together with all other Christians, they 
qualify as “insiders” within a large majority, but if they are distinguished 
from other Christians such as Catholics and liberal Protestants, they may 
sometimes be an outsider minority.147 Smith concludes from this that 
categories like minority or outsider “are so elastic and manipulable as to 
be almost useless.”148 Although I will try to show how a minority-
protection emphasis can be viable, I agree that distinctions of 
minority/majority and outsider/insider are highly contestable and 
manipulable. This is largely because there are several different possible 
“maps” for defining the key religious distinctions and categories in 
America today. Each map leads to a different categorization of the relevant 
competing faiths, and therefore to a different judgment about who 
constitutes the minority. And choosing which of these maps best reflects a 
particular situation is, again, the kind of variable analysis that probably 
exceeds the competence of courts. 
 145. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 146. Id. The case has since settled. 
 147. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 149, 217 (1991) (“If one frames a category broadly—‘Christian,’ for example, or 
‘theist’—then nearly all American citizens will be ‘insiders.’ If one defines categories more 
specifically—by denomination, for instance—then everyone will be part of a religious minority.”). 
 148. Id. 
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a. Traditional Denominational Differences 
Many analyses of church-state relations rest on a traditional map of 
American religions that emphasizes differences of “creed, religious 
observance, or ecclesiastical politics.”149 In this model the key distinctions 
lie between Christians and Jews (and other non-Christian faiths), and in 
some instances between Protestants and Catholics. 
Under the Christian-Jewish distinction, obviously Christians constitute 
the overwhelming majority and Jews or other non-Christians the outsider 
minority.150 Many analyses of religion and the state from a minority-rights 
perspective employ this model. Historian Naomi Cohen writes that Jews 
have been “the quintessential outsiders” in “a society whose culture was 
steeped in Christianity.”151 Stephen Feldman writes of “the Christian 
domination of American society and culture” and of Jews as “the 
prototypical religious outgroup,” and he generally equates “religious 
outsiders” with “non-Christians.”152 Suzanna Sherry writes that “modern 
American Judaism” differs in numerous ways from Christianity, “the 
dominant religious sect in the United States,” and therefore that permitting 
more religion in the public square would harm Jews and benefit 
Christians.153
A second traditional religious division, between Protestants and 
Catholics, is the central motif of Michael Newsom, who argues that 
America “was and still is a Protestant Empire.”154 Professor Newsom sees 
the dominance of Protestantism as not merely historical legacy, but as 
“present reality.”155 This dominant Protestantism is marked by “an 
opposition to Roman Catholicism” and “a dedication to convert the people 
of the United States to Protestantism,” although it usually pursues these 
goals through “attrition and restraint . . . rather than the use of the most 
 149. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 105 
(1991). 
 150. In the 2001 American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) by the City University of New 
York, 76.5 percent of Americans gave their religious identity as Christian. ARIS, 
http://www.gc.cuny.edu/studies/key_findings.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter ARIS 
Survey]. However, this is a significant drop from the 1990 figure of 86.2 percent. Id. 
 151. COHEN, supra note 43, at 3. 
 152. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 229; Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 4, at 7–8 n.27. 
 153. Sherry, supra note 4, at 508, 501. 
 154. Michael deHaven Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant 
Empire, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 219, 222 (2002) [hereinafter Newsom, Common School Religion]. 
See generally Michael deHaven Newsom, The American Protestant Empire: A Historical Perspective, 
40 WASHBURN L.J. 187 (2001) [hereinafter Newsom, Protestant Empire]. 
 155. Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 154, at 264. 
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violent forms of coercion.”156 Newsom particularly focuses on activity in 
public schools by evangelical Protestants, whom he describes as 
“aggressive, typically majoritarian religious groups” visiting 
“psychological harm . . . upon school children belonging to minority 
religious groups and their families.”157 Whether the religious activity in 
public schools is initiated by students or by school officials, in both cases 
he sees the schools providing “instrumental assistance to the forces of the 
Protestant Empire.”158
This creedal-liturgical-denominational map certainly reflects aspects of 
religious identity and difference in America. These traditional lines of 
religious conflict came over from Europe and have remained important in 
America. The struggle in the founding era involved established Protestant 
denominations imposing upon Catholics, Jews, and Protestant 
dissenters.159 A generalized Protestant consensus throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries surely marginalized Catholics and 
Jews around the nation.160 Moreover, this model still captures important 
features of religious difference and conflict in many places today, for 
example in the Alabama school where teachers forced Jewish children to 
celebrate Jesus’s birthday. The frequent issues where government actions 
affect non-Sunday worshipers—employment requirements, scheduling of 
government events on Friday and Saturday, and so forth—also generally 
involve Christian majority assumptions conflicting with the practices of 
non-Christian adherents. 
But the creedal-liturgical-denominational model fails to explain many 
other issues and disputes in American religion and culture. It assumes too 
much of a homogeneous Christian or Protestant majority, and it overlooks 
how believers of different creeds align with each other on important 
 156. Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 222–23 (adding, however, that 
methods of violent coercion “remain in the background”). In Professor Newsom’s view, the Protestant 
Empire also is characterized by “pan-Protestantism”—a pattern of cooperation between Protestant 
groups, even where there may also be conflict and competition between them”—and by “a belief in 
social reform.” Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 154, at 195 n.60. For further discussion, see 
infra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
 157. Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 225. 
 158. Id. at 225–26, 227 (calling any distinction between student-initiated and school-sponsored 
activity “a distinction without a difference” and “empty formalism at its worst”). 
 159. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 43, at 22–30 (describing Sunday laws, restrictions of office to 
Christians, Christian official oaths, and other disabilities on Jews); Gaffney, supra note 37, at 279–80 
(describing Protestant tests for office in several states, coercive Protestant establishment in Maryland, 
and other impositions on Catholics); McConnell, supra note 65, at 1437–49 (describing struggle of 
Baptists and other evangelicals for religious freedom in Virginia and New England). 
 160. See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text; see also COHEN, supra note 43, at 65–92 
(describing effect of nineteenth century “Christian agenda” on Jews). 
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cultural and political issues. Several very different models are necessary to 
capture other key points of religious difference today. The other models 
produce different conclusions about who is a religious minority or 
outsider. 
b. Traditionalist Versus Progressive and Religious Versus Secular 
In his book Culture Wars, sociologist James Davison Hunter argues 
that “it is increasingly difficult to speak of the Protestant position or the 
Catholic position or the Jewish position (or, for that matter, the Mormon 
or Buddhist position) vis-à-vis American public culture.”161 Rather, 
the politically consequential divisions are those that separate the 
orthodox from the progressive within religious traditions. And 
orthodox and progressive factions of the various faiths do not speak 
out as isolated voices but increasingly as a common chorus. In this, 
the political relevance of the historical divisions between Protestant 
and Catholic and Christian and Jew has largely become defunct.162
Douglas Laycock agrees that in many cases, “[t]he principal fight is no 
longer between Catholics and Protestants, or between Christians and Jews, 
or even between believers and nonbelievers,” but between “‘orthodox’ and 
‘progressive’ elements of all these groups.”163 He further explains the 
“religious dimensions” of the conflict: 
In Hunter’s terminology, the orthodox remain committed “to an 
external, definable, and transcendent authority.” Usually this 
transcendent authority is religious, but for culturally conservative 
nonbelievers, it may be natural law or some other source of moral 
absolutes. The progressives tend to view truth “as a process, as a 
reality that is ever unfolding.” Religious progressives thus tend to 
“resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions 
of contemporary life.”164
 161. HUNTER, supra note 149, at 105. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The 
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1073 (1996) (citing 
HUNTER, supra note 149, at 42–66). 
 164. Id. at 1073 (quoting HUNTER, supra note 149, at 44–46); see also, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, 
Michael Heise & Andrew Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical 
Analysis of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 565–66, 580 (2004) (distinguishing 
between denominational and traditionalist-progressive divides and describing importance of latter). 
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The traditionalist/progressive divide has replaced the older creedal-
liturgical-denominational divides in many contexts. Progressives of 
various faiths were the first ones to engage in ecumenical dialogue and 
work together to advance shared views on moral-political issues.165 More 
recently, traditionalists among Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and even 
Muslims—who once fought or at best ignored each other—have come to 
share views on issues such as abortion and homosexuality and cooperate to 
advance those views politically.166 Correspondingly, traditionalists and 
progressives within each faith or denomination wrestle with each other so 
much that denominational identity often matters very little. Within 
American Protestantism, the two camps regularly take sharply opposed 
positions on church-state relations, abortion, gay rights, and various 
theological matters.167 The homosexuality debate has generated serious 
talk of schism in two major Protestant denominations, the Episcopal and 
Methodist.168 Similar debates contribute to divisions between the Orthodox 
and Reform camps of Judaism.169
Alongside the traditionalist/progressive divide lies a “religious/secular” 
divide: between citizens who derive their social-political commitments 
from religious norms and those who derive them from secular norms. This 
distinction overlaps some with the traditionalist/progressive conflict. 
Although many progressives are inspired by religious faith, they tend, as 
Hunter notes, to “resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing 
assumptions of contemporary life.”170 Religious progressives are more 
willing than religious traditionalists to draw explicitly on secular norms 
and insights for their moral and political beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the religious-secular divide differs from the traditionalist-
progressive. Churches that are left-leaning theologically and politically 
resist some secular trends that traditionalists tolerate or embrace. For 
 165. HUNTER, supra note 149, at 99–101. 
 166. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 163, at 1073–74; Carolyn Lochhead, Alliance Backs Ban on 
Gay Marriages; Religious, Ethnic Leaders Join Forces, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2003, at A3, available 
at 2003 WL 3763160 (noting presence of Muslim groups in coalition seeking constitutional 
amendment against same-sex marriage). 
 167. See generally HUNTER, supra note 149 (describing the conflicts at length). Just two of the 
other works describing this realignment include DEAN HOGE, DIVISIONS IN THE PROTESTANT HOUSE 
(1976); and ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1988). 
 168. See Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Methodists Propose Schism Over Gay Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A16; Jane Lampman, Anglicans Gather to Confront Historic Rift, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 14, 2003, at 1. 
 169. Carlyle Murphy, A Haven for Gay Jews: After 25 Years, Congregation Is Thriving, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 1, 1999, at B1; see also COHEN, supra note 43, at 232, 241 (noting disputes between 
Orthodox and other Jewish bodies on church-state issues). 
 170. HUNTER, supra note 149, at 44–45. 
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example, liberal churches recently challenged portions of a Minnesota 
“conceal-carry” law that gave non-felons the right to carry guns in public 
and that limited the ability of property owners, including churches, to bar 
guns from their premises.171 The law’s “conservative” proponents made 
secular arguments that increased carrying of guns reduces crime; the 
“progressive” churches in the minority appealed to biblical themes of 
peacemaking and sought a free exercise exemption from the general 
norm.172 The same is true on other issues: for example, some proponents 
of same-sex marriage make Biblical arguments about equality and 
inclusion, while defenders of traditional marriage often argue their 
position in secular rather than religious terms.173
It might seem that the religious are the overwhelming majority 
everywhere in America, and the secular the minority. The share of 
Americans who say they have no religious affiliation, though rising, had 
still reached only 14 percent in 2001; and 81 percent identify with a 
particular religious group.174 The numbers who believe in God are 
substantially higher.175 But the numbers who take their religion seriously 
are, and always have been, substantially smaller. In the 2001 survey, only 
37 percent described their outlook on life as “religious”; 38 percent chose 
the more ambivalent response of “somewhat religious.”176 Although this 
doubles the numbers of those with a secular outlook, it suggests that a 
large group identifies with religion but not vigorously. Further supporting 
this is the fact that “nearly 40 percent of respondents who identified with a 
religion indicated that neither they themselves nor anyone else in their 
household belongs to a church or some other similar institution.”177 The 
researchers conclude that a prominent feature of modern America is 
“invisible religion,” which “legitimates the retreat of the individual into 
 171. See, e.g., Karen Youso, Religious Groups Tackle New Conceal-and-Carry Gun Law, MINN. 
STAR-TRIB., May 24, 2003, at 1B. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Compare Walter Wink, To Hell with Gays?, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 5, 2002, at 32, 
available at 2002 WL 9378511 (claiming that “the Bible has no sex ethic,” but rather behavior “is to 
be critiqued by Jesus’ love commandment,” which calls for behavior that is “responsible, mutual, 
caring and loving”); with Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage: The Road to Polyamory, THE WKLY. 
STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL 6818991 (claiming a “rational basis for blocking both 
gay marriage and polygamy, [preserving a stable family environment for children, that] does not 
depend upon a vague or religiously based disapproval of homosexuality or polygamy”). 
 174. ARIS Survey, supra note 150 (noting rise in “no affiliation” category from 8 percent in 1990). 
 175. See Bill Cessato, 9th Circuit Didn’t Diminish God, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 6, 2003, at 3, 
available at 2003 WL 4194939 (citing “Gallup Organization’s 2002 Index of Leading Religious 
Indicators [finding that] 95 percent of Americans believe in God or a universal spirit”). 
 176. ARIS Survey, supra note 150, at Exhibit 3. 
 177. Id. 
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the ‘private sphere’ and sanctifies his (or her) subjective autonomy.”178 
The divide between basic religious identity and serious religious 
commitment is familiar and longstanding. In 1980 polls, 94 percent of 
Americans reported professed belief in God, but only 58 percent reported 
that religion was “very important” to them.179 Even in the 1950s, a high 
point for American religiosity in which large majorities of Americans 
described religion as “very important,” 54 percent of those who claimed 
such importance nevertheless said that their religious beliefs had no effect 
“on [their] ideas of politics and business.”180
Thus the real “religious-secular” divide may be between citizens who 
take religion seriously as a guide to beliefs and behavior and those who do 
not. And although the seriously religious may be too diffuse and 
widespread to constitute a true “discrete and insular minority,” they are 
sometimes the cultural outsiders, singled out by a secular-oriented society 
for discrimination that milder adherents do not receive. The Third Circuit 
recently ruled that although prosecutors could not use peremptory 
challenges to exclude a potential juror based on his mere religious 
affiliation, they could exclude him based on his “strong religious beliefs” 
and “heightened involvement” in religious matters (he attended church and 
read the Bible regularly).181 More controversially, it can also be argued 
that a distrust of deeply felt religion appears in Supreme Court decisions 
denying aid to “pervasively sectarian” schools.182 Likewise, it is at least 
disconcerting that the Court in Locke v. Davey183 has now allowed states to 
deny students college scholarship aid, available to students pursuing 
hundreds of different majors, solely because the students in question are 
pursuing ministerial training—in Justice Scalia’s words, solely because 
their “belief in their religion is so strong that they dedicate their study and 
their lives to its ministry.”184
 178. Id. (quoting THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE INVISIBLE RELIGION (1967)). 
 179. KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 119, at 9 tbl.1-1. 
 180. HERBERG, supra note 52, at 73 (citing polls). 
 181. United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 182. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding that a rule 
against aid to pervasively religious schools “reserve[s] special hostility for those . . . who think that 
their religion should affect the whole of their lives”). 
 183. 540 U.S. 713 (2004). 
 184. Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course, the exclusion of students pursing clergy training 
from state aid programs may be defensible under other Religion Clause criteria. But it should be 
recognized that under at least one important map of religious differences, those students are in the 
religious minority because of the seriousness of their faith commitment. If a minority-protection 
approach governs, this exclusion should be treated as constitutionally suspect. 
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Compared with the longstanding creedal or denominational patterns, 
these other maps of religious divides—traditional/progressive, 
religious/secular—produce different conclusions about who is a religious 
minority or outsider. For example, although fundamentalists and 
evangelicals belong to an overwhelming Christian majority, they may be a 
minority or outsiders in some places and on certain issues. In some 
jurisdictions, progressive Christians join with progressive Jews and 
nonbelievers to pass gay-rights laws, which raise significant religious 
freedom questions if they are applied to traditionalist religious 
organizations or to relatively private economic conduct like the rental 
policies of small landlords.185 These struggles will surely escalate in 
coming years as gay rights become more widely accepted. Similarly, 
although Christians as a whole dominate the religious map of Nebraska, 
the traditionalist views of Douglas Rader were outsider views to state 
university officials. One of them, a Baptist minister, said that in his 
judgment the atmosphere in the dorms posed no threat to students of 
Christian faith186—an example of how beliefs among Christians sharply 
conflict. I use evangelical Christians as only one example. In other 
settings, like most of the rural South, non-Christians and religious 
progressives would constitute the minority, vulnerable to pressure by an 
evangelically oriented majority. 
This variety of maps undercuts many of the premises of other scholars 
who identify “religious minorities” and argue for their protection. 
Professor Newsom discusses the differences between evangelical and 
liberal Protestants,187 but at crucial points in his argument the distinction 
disappears. For example, he states that “the Protestant Empire”—
Protestant, unqualified by “evangelical”—“seeks to convert [other 
Americans] to evangelical Protestantism.”188 This is important to his 
 185. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 (1999), vacated as 
unripe, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (landlord refusing to rent to unmarried cohabiting couple); 
Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San Francisco, No. 760-028, 1980 WL 4657 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980) (church refusing to hire openly gay organist); Smith v. Fair Employment & 
Housing Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) (same). 
 186. Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553–54 (noting that the official unconstitutionally “judg[ed] Rader’s 
petition in terms of his own religious experiences”). 
 187. See, e.g., Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 236–37 (describing how, 
although liberal Protestants in 1800s supported religious exercises in public schools, the policies 
ultimately were “shaped by evangelical Protestants, rather than liberal[s]”); id. at 237 (recognizing that 
“[l]iberal Protestantism of the present day . . . tends to” oppose evangelical attempts to impose religion 
in public schools); see also Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 154, at 249. 
 188. Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 226; see also id. (arguing that 
Protestant forces “strive to convert school children belonging to minority religions to some form of 
evangelical Protestantism”). 
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argument. He calls evangelicalism a “majoritarian religion” that “visit[s] 
psychological harm on the followers of minority religions,”189 but in many 
locations and institutional contexts it would require a combination of very 
disparate evangelicals and liberals to produce any Protestant majority. 
Professor Newsom asserts that “pan-Protestantism”—“a pattern of 
cooperation between Protestant groups, even where there may also be 
conflict and competition between them”—continues to be a powerful force 
in American religious life, but the evidence for this is not very strong.190
The image of a dominant, proselytizing Protestantism fails to capture 
conditions in much of America today. With traditionalist and progressive 
Protestants often at each other’s throats, there is typically no single set of 
“goals and objectives of an American Protestant empire,” no common 
“social reform that serves the interests of the Protestant empire,” and little 
“affinity of various Protestant sects” that can be reinforced by “their 
shared political and legal control of the common schools.”191 As for 
proselytization—or in more neutral language, preaching to seek 
conversions—mainline Protestant bodies now tend to be at least lukewarm 
on it and often to oppose it as a form of triumphalism inconsistent with 
Christian tolerance and humility.192 Proselytizing faiths dominate only in 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 154, at 195 n.60. His historical examples of 
common projects among Protestants include the 19th-century development of public schools, the 
revivalism of the first and second Great Awakenings, and the movement to prohibit alcohol. See, e.g., 
id. at 195 n.60, 242–43, 253–54. But today large numbers of evangelicals regard the public schools as 
hostile, while most liberal Protestants reject any kind of revivalistic efforts to convert others to 
Christianity, and significant alcohol prohibitions are limited to a few places in the rural South and 
Midwest (where, I have already conceded, evangelical Protestantism tends to hold a dominant position 
alone). See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text; infra note 192. Today liberal and evangelical 
Protestant views on contested social issues are usually in conflict, with a few exceptions such as 
opposition to state-sponsored gambling. Professor Newsom also emphasizes the widely shared 
Protestant doctrine concerning the Christian Eucharist: that the bread and wine merely represent or 
memorialize Christ’s body and blood, as opposed to becoming the body and blood as in Catholic 
doctrine. Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 154, at 248. This difference is real, but it plays very 
little role in disputes over religion and public life. The few exceptions may be cases where the 
sacramental use of wine is at issue, and the question whether Catholic student groups will be barred 
from meeting in schoolrooms like other student clubs because they must have a non-student—a 
priest—to celebrate Mass. On the latter question, Professor Newsom raises a valid point. See infra 
notes 361–63 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 226. 
 192. See, e.g., Milton J. Coalter, Presbyterian Evangelism: A Case of Parallel Allegiances 
Diverging, in THE DIVERSITY OF DISCIPLESHIP: THE PRESBYTERIANS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
CHRISTIAN WITNESS 33, 53 (Milton J. Coalter et al. eds., 1991) (describing how mainline 
denominations concluded in 1960s that “evangelical outreach had ignored serious social evils . . . in an 
effort to bolster the size and financial strength of their particular institutions,” and how denominations 
adopted “a muted verbal witness in the interest of cooperation with non-Christians for social justice”); 
Ernest Tucker, Planned Baptist Gathering Touches Off Controversy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at 
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places where evangelicals dominate, and where evangelicals are marginal 
so is proselytism. Recall the stiff resistance to student religious clubs in 
New York, where evangelicals are at their weakest.193
Likewise, Professor Feldman’s description of a unified dominant 
conservative Christianity194 probably captures the situation in Oklahoma, 
but in other contexts it is inapplicable. The numbers for Christianity 
include the two groups of progressive and traditional Christians, and in 
many places and on many issues, these two camps are far too busy 
fighting each other to focus on anything that unifies them as against Jews. 
Similar criticisms apply to Professor Sherry’s account of how to protect 
religious minorities. Sherry has long advanced the ideal of a secular public 
sphere from which religious perspectives are excluded.195 Most recently 
she has argued that “allowing religious reasons to justify public policy will 
have a negative effect on religious minorities, especially Jews.”196 She 
explains that most Jews, those in the Reform and Conservative bodies, 
have embraced the ideal of secular reason stemming from the 
Enlightenment. Thus, the increased use of religion in public arguments 
will expand the influence in society of “unquestioning faith”—which she 
associates with Christianity197—and conflict with the method by which 
most Jews reason about public matters.198
Sherry’s argument partly reflects the erroneous premise that there is a 
single set of “faith”-based Christian arguments. But her argument also 
oversimplifies the position of American Jews. She concedes, as she must, 
that the “inclination toward reason . . . is of great concern to some 
Orthodox Jews,” the Jews “opposed to the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment.”199 Her answer? “But fewer than eight percent of 
American Jews consider themselves Orthodox.”200 In other words, we 
should identify the interest of Jews as a minority group by means of what 
most Jews think, ignoring the smaller group of Jews who think quite 
differently. This is an ironic argument indeed in an article whose titular 
concern is to make America “safe for religious minorities.” 
18, available at 1999 WL 6568641 (describing opposition of Chicago mainline Protestants to proposed 
Southern Baptist evangelistic campaign in city). 
 193. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 194. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 282–86. 
 195. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453 (1996). 
 196. Sherry, supra note 4, at 502. 
 197. Id. at 508. 
 198. Id. at 508–09 (“Thus, to appeal to religious belief is to appeal to faith rather than to reason, 
and in the United States the appeal to faith necessarily excludes most Jews.”). 
 199. Id. at 511, 513. 
 200. Id. at 513. 
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Where the most relevant divide is Christian-Jew, Jews may possess a 
single interest. But where the more relevant cultural divide is 
traditionalist-progressive, one sector of Judaism may align more with the 
cultural majority, the other with the cultural minority. Although Sherry 
treats Jews as a core religious minority, she simultaneously argues that 
“being Jewish has always been at least as much a question of culture and 
ritual, of community and heritage, as of faith,” and she quotes approvingly 
the thesis that “Jews lost their faith so easily because they had no faith to 
lose.”201 These statements betray the possibility she never considers: that 
secularized Jews sometimes operate less as a minority than as part of the 
very large group in America that has fully embraced the Enlightenment. In 
many places and institutions, this group is the numerical and cultural 
majority; Sherry herself proclaims that “[t]he Age of Reason has replaced 
the centuries-long age of religion.”202 Often the traditionalist wing of 
Orthodox Judaism, divorced from a dominant secular culture, constitutes 
the religious minority that most needs protection from imposition of 
majoritarian values through government. Significantly, when Sherry 
criticizes the Court for refusing to protect Jewish practices from 
burdensome general laws, the cases she cites all involve Orthodox 
litigants.203 She has no case in which a less traditionalist Jewish group—
Reform or Conservative—was subjected to a burdensome general law. 
Let me repeat: I agree that in many places and institutions in the nation, 
evangelical Christians dominate culturally and politically and non-
Christians constitute minorities. But in many other places and institutions, 
and on certain issues, traditionalist Christians join traditionalist Orthodox 
Jews as the outsiders. No sound minority-protection approach to the 
Religion Clauses can rest on one single account of religious alignments. 
c. Church Versus Sect and Acculturated Versus Unacculturated 
A final important model of religious difference distinguishes between 
groups (usually large) whose views harmonize with the general culture 
and other groups (usually small) who dissent and withdraw from the 
 201. Id. at 512, 513 (quotation omitted). 
 202. Id. at 511. 
 203. Id. at 504–06; Bd. of Educ., Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) 
(invalidating creation of special school district to educate Satmar Hasidic children separate from other 
children)); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying exemption for Orthodox soldier 
from uniform policies that forbade wearing yarmulke), superseded by 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2004); 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (denying exemption for Orthodox merchants from Sunday 
closing laws). 
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culture. Theologian Ernst Troeltsch, chronicling the relation of Christian 
denominations toward state and society, drew a famous distinction 
between “church” and “sect.”204 The church seeks to be “universal,” and to 
achieve mass membership it “to a certain extent accepts the social order, 
. . . utilizes the state and the ruling classes, and weaves these elements into 
her own life.”205 Sects, by contrast, “are comparatively small groups [that] 
aspire after personal inward perfection [and] a direct personal fellowship 
between the members” and accordingly “renounce the idea of dominating 
the world” and adopt an “indifferent” or even “hostile” attitude toward 
state and society.206 The prototypical church was the Roman Catholic 
Church or the established Protestant churches of northern Europe; the 
prototypical sects were the medieval monastic movements or the 
Anabaptists of the Reformation. 
More recently, theologian H. Richard Niebuhr refined Troeltsch’s two 
categories into five, including the alternatives of “Christ of culture”—
groups that harmonize Christian ideals with the broader culture—and 
“Christ apart from culture”—groups that withdraw from culture because it 
is unredeemable.207 Sociologists of religion agree “that marginal religious 
groups or sects are characterized by 1) an emphasis on doctrinal purity; 2) 
hostility to or disassociation from the prevailing culture; and 3) a strict 
code of behavior.”208 Whatever the precise framework, we can speak of 
religious groups as relatively “acculturated,” comfortable with the 
dominant culture, or “unacculturated,” antagonistic to or withdrawn from 
the culture.209
This map of religions may be the most useful of all for a minority-
oriented approach to religious freedom. By definition, acculturated groups 
fall in the cultural mainstream and unacculturated groups outside it. 
Unacculturated faiths are the outsiders, alienated from dominant values, 
whom courts should be particularly concerned to protect. Unacculturated 
faiths also tend to be numerical minorities, because they maintain a 
demanding purity in doctrine and behavior rather than seeking mass 
 204. 1 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 331 (Harper & 
Brothers 1960) (1911). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See generally H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951). 
 208. Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 652, 654 (1983). 
 209. For discussion of the distinction, and an insightful application to free exercise cases, see 
Angela C. Carmella, The Religion Clauses and Acculturated Religious Conduct: Boundaries for the 
Regulation of Religion, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND REGULATING RELIGION 
IN PUBLIC LIFE 21, 29–37 (James E. Wood & Derek Davis eds., 1993). 
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membership. It is true that numbers and acculturation can diverge; as 
mentioned above, some small religious bodies enjoy cultural power or 
share the dominant values.210 But that may simply prove that acculturation 
matters more than numbers. Even a small group needs little protection 
from the majority if its views track the majority’s. Thus lack of 
acculturation is a prima facie indicator of minority status. 
However, a map of religions based on acculturation still has 
complications that make it difficult to use to categorize faiths for 
constitutional purposes. First, “[t]he sect-church typology is a continuum”; 
some faiths fall in the middle (as, for example, with Jews who observe 
many Jewish laws but are non-Orthodox), and many faiths are evolving, 
commonly toward greater acculturation as their membership rises in 
numbers and in social standing.211 Such evolution may again destabilize 
constitutional doctrine in the way that Justice Powell warned. 
Even more important, many religious groups harmonize with the 
broader culture on some clusters of issues and conflict with it on others. 
As the University of Nebraska case exemplifies, serious evangelical 
Protestants often conflict with the majority culture on questions of sexual 
ethics such as abortion and premarital sex.212 But evangelicals largely 
share widespread middle-class values about money and lifestyle.213 
Conversely, liberal Protestant churches are commonly identified as the 
most acculturated religious bodies, but their leaders often take an 
adversarial stance toward the majority on social issues such as war and 
peace, immigration, and welfare policy.214 Finally, as I have emphasized 
already, a religious group may be alienated from the majority in one 
location but quite in line with the majority in another.215
 210. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (discussing Episcopalians). 
 211. Way & Burt, supra note 208, at 652 (citing as examples “[t]he nineteenth-century 
transformation of rural Methodism [from a revivalist movement to a mainline denomination]” and “the 
more recent transformation of Mormonism” from a despised sect to a mainstream, socially 
conservative church). 
 212. See, e.g., The Barna Group, Born Again Adults Remain Firm in Opposition to Abortion and 
Gay Marriage, at http://www.barna.org/FlexPage.aspx?=BarnaUpdate&BarnaUpdateID=94 (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2004) (reporting that evangelicals oppose abortion at significantly higher rate than 
non-evangelicals). 
 213. See, e.g., Joel Carpenter, Contemporary Evangelicalism and Mammon: Some Thoughts, in 
MORE MONEY, MORE MINISTRY: MONEY AND EVANGELICALS IN RECENT NORTH AMERICAN 
HISTORY 399, 401 (2000) (“[T]he whole ethos of postwar evangelicalism is driven by the adage [that] 
more money means more ministry. . . . [Evangelicals] are deeply infused with the American capitalist 
cultural understanding of the gospel.”). 
 214. See, e.g., THOMAS C. REEVES, THE EMPTY CHURCH: THE SUICIDE OF LIBERAL 
CHRISTIANITY 158 (1996) (criticizing this tendency). 
 215. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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4. Rules to Protect Whoever is the Minority 
The factors just discussed complicate the task of defining particular 
groups as inherently minority-outsider or majority-insider. Some groups 
may be consistent outsiders in America: perhaps Muslims, or the even 
smaller, less familiar immigrant religions such as Sikhs or Hindus. But the 
majority/minority status of many groups will vary, depending on which of 
the above “maps” of American religion most accurately describes the 
geographical or institutional context in which the dispute arises. As a 
result, a minority-protection approach to the Religion Clauses should not 
rest on defining certain faiths as everywhere and always “minorities,” as 
previous commentators have sought to do, and then asking what will be 
best for those groups. 
To put it another way, a minority-protection approach in religion cases 
should not rest on the method characteristic of race-based affirmative 
action: identifying certain groups as disadvantaged and adopting a 
different constitutional rule for them than for others. The objections that 
Justice Powell raised in Bakke apply with at least equal force to the project 
of singling out some religious groups as disadvantaged. Indeed, the 
objections are probably stronger in the religion context. Notwithstanding 
the civil rights advances of the last fifty years, African-Americans as a 
group unquestionably remain more subject to racial prejudice, and lower 
on the social and economic scale, than whites; the pattern of disadvantages 
is strong and cuts across various aspects of life.216 By contrast, given the 
complexity of religious identities and differences in America, it is even 
more the case in religion that “the variable sociological and political 
analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the 
judicial competence.”217 Continuing with Powell’s terms, I can think of 
few better ways to “exacerbate [religious] tensions”218 than to pick out 
some groups, characterize them in a certain contestable way, and define 
them as always dominant and in need of restraint. Blanket judgments 
about who is a majority and minority are overinclusive or underinclusive 
too often to serve as the basis for constitutional rules. 
But the flaws in this “affirmative action” approach to religion do not 
mean that a minority-protection approach is impossible. As I argued 
earlier, the approach should not identify particular faiths as inherent 
 216. See generally ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, 
UNEQUAL 17–30 (1992). 
 217. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 218. Id. at 298. 
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minorities, but should adopt constitutional rules for various categories of 
disputes that work to protect and equalize minority rights, whoever the 
minority happens to be. The rule for a given category of issues must apply 
to all faiths, as the text of the Religion Clauses strongly implies. But the 
choice of rule can be influenced by what course will best protect whoever 
is in the minority in the relevant context. The goal should be to identify the 
dynamics of government action that impose burdens upon minorities, and 
the dynamics of constitutional rules that protect and equalize minorities. 
Such an approach resembles the “veil of ignorance” that John Rawls 
proposed as a tool for constructing basic political institutions.219 Rawls 
abstracted away from knowledge about persons’ ideological, social, or 
economic position as a device to avoid special pleading and ensure that 
political institutions are fair to all citizens. Similarly, analysis of minority 
religious rights should, as much as possible, avoid the premise that any 
given faith is always a majority or minority. But into the veil of ignorance, 
Rawls built assumptions designed to favor the least well off, on the theory 
that all of us rationally would want to avoid ending up in such a 
position.220 Similarly, one can build Religion Clause doctrines that protect 
the religious liberty and equal standing of religious minorities, whoever 
that happens to be in a given context. 
Even this proposed method sometimes requires judgments about the 
nature of religious differences in America. Choosing a rule that most 
protects minority faiths involves determining what practices and 
conditions are particularly important to minority faiths, which in turn 
requires some evidence of what particular minority faiths over the years 
have viewed as important. Thus in analyzing legal questions in Part III, I 
refer back to the various maps of the religious landscape to suggest how 
constitutional rules would affect various faiths that are likely to be 
minorities in particular contexts. But I will try to give weight to all of the 
maps set out above: to take seriously both the fact that in some contexts 
Christians still impose on non-Christians, and the fact that in other 
contexts a secular society imposes on rigorous or countercultural believers 
of all faiths. 
 219. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (4th prtg. 1980) (1971). Thanks to Mike Paulsen for 
pointing out the analogy to Rawls. 
 220. Id. at 18–19. 
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C. Differing Goals in Protecting Religious Minorities 
A final complication is that a minority-protection approach can include 
different goals that compete with each other. As already noted, the 
protection of religious minorities can include both positive protection of 
their ability to practice their faith and negative protection against the 
imposition of a different, majoritarian faith.221 In addition, a third objective 
may be to equalize the status of minority faiths with that of the majority. 
These goals are largely consistent, but they can conflict. For example, 
minority faiths might be equalized with majority faiths by giving special 
attention to the minority’s claims of religious freedom. But equalization 
could also be accomplished by restricting the majority’s freedom. Such a 
restriction produces equality, but it does nothing for the minority’s 
positive religious freedom. In my view, such an approach misplaces the 
priorities; the positive religious liberty of minorities should be the most 
important goal. If members of a religious minority cannot engage in a 
practice important to their faith, it should be little consolation to them that 
adherents of other faiths cannot engage in practices important to them 
either. Prohibiting all religious practices of all faiths would be equal, but it 
would scarcely help minority religions. 
What about the distinction between negative and positive protection: 
between ensuring that minorities can practice their faith and ensuring that 
they are not imposed on by other faiths? Both goals are important. 
Fortunately, they usually coincide. When government pressures a minority 
to participate in a majoritarian religious ceremony such as an official 
prayer, it not only imposes an alien faith on the minority, but also typically 
interferes with the minority’s independent development of its own 
religious views. The two goals come in conflict only if the negative 
protection against religious imposition is taken to the extreme of shielding 
minorities from any religious speech or activity by purely private 
individuals—for example, if public schools single out student religious 
clubs for exclusion from general school-club programs in order to protect 
students of other faiths from any sort of exposure to the religious speech. 
As I will argue below,222 such an exclusion is likely to suppress the 
positive religious exercise of some minority adherents as well. Contrary to 
what some commentators have argued, a minority-protection approach 
does not provide support for such suppression.  
 221. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 222. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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III. MINORITY PROTECTION IN CATEGORIES OF RELIGION CASES 
Having discussed in general terms how to define and defend a 
minority-protection approach, I turn to how such an approach might apply 
to the major categories of recurring disputes under the Religion Clauses. 
A. Religious Exercise and Exemptions from Law 
The first major Religion Clause category concerns how the government 
should act when the general laws it passes come in conflict with 
religiously motivated conduct. One question is whether the government is 
constitutionally mandated to exempt such conduct so as to avoid 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court’s current 
doctrine, set forth in Employment Division v. Smith,223 says that an 
exemption is usually not required,224 although the doctrine has ambiguities 
that I will discuss shortly. A second question is whether the government 
constitutionally has discretion to exempt religiously motivated conduct by 
its own choice. Current doctrine holds some statutory exemptions valid 
and others invalid, without clear lines for distinguishing the two. The 
division between mandated and discretionary exemptions is a division 
between judicial decisions and legislative or administrative decisions. 
1. Constitutionally Mandated Exemptions 
A minority-protection approach provides a strong case for 
constitutionally mandated exemptions declared by courts. General laws 
enacted by democratic bodies will, almost by definition, reflect the values 
of the majority or at least the politically powerful. The laws may thereby 
conflict with the values and practices of minority or outsider religions. 
Without exemptions, therefore, generally applicable laws inevitably will 
impose from time to time on the liberty of the religious minority. The 
imposition is no less because the law is general in its form. As Justice 
Souter recognized in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah,225 “‘[n]eutral, generally applicable’ laws, drafted as they are from 
the perspective of the nonadherent, have the unavoidable potential of 
putting the believer to a choice between God and government.”226
 223. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 224. Id. at 879–81 (holding that Free Exercise Clause seldom if ever “bars application of a neutral, 
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action”). 
 225. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 226. Id. at 577 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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Constitutionally mandated exemptions also serve the goal of equalizing 
the status of minority religions with that of the majority. Because laws 
tend to reflect the majority’s values, rules that on their face treat all faiths 
equally, and reflect no intent to discriminate, will nevertheless have an 
unequal impact on different faiths. Wearing headgear or other religious 
garb is not a religious duty for most Christian groups, but it is for 
observant Jews and other minorities, who are therefore disproportionately 
harmed by the facially neutral military uniform requirements upheld in 
Goldman v. Weinberger.227 Alcohol is a more familiar substance than 
peyote, and therefore the controlled-substance laws, without exemptions, 
impact Native American worshipers but not Roman Catholic or 
Episcopalians. Constitutionally mandated exemptions allow “the courts, 
which are institutionally more attuned to the interests of the less powerful 
segments of society, to extend to minority religions the same degree of 
solicitude that more mainstream religions are able to attain through the 
political process.”228
Free exercise exemptions recognized by courts under a general, across-
the-board constitutional standard operate in the way advocated in Part II of 
this Article. They work to protect whoever is a minority faith in a given 
situation. Whichever group finds its religious practices in conflict with 
majoritarian laws can demand that the government articulate a sufficient 
reason—a “compelling” reason, in the phrase used by many constitutional 
decisions229—for restricting those practices. 
Some commentators have denied that free exercise exemptions doctrine 
works to protect and equalize minority religions. Mark Tushnet, for 
example, has argued that exemption claims will more likely succeed for 
“the kinds of worship that the Justices of the Supreme Court are 
accustomed to” than for “non-mainstream denominations, sects, and 
cults.”230 He and other critics observe that the winners of free exercise 
accommodation cases in the Supreme Court before Smith were all 
Christians in some form—Seventh-Day Adventists, Amish, and Jehovah’s 
 227. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to burdens imposed by military 
regulations, or to exempt an Orthodox air force officer from uniform requirements that prevented him 
wearing his yarmulke). 
 228. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1109, 1132 (1990). 
 229. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, § 3(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2000) 
(compelling-interest standard under federal statute); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963) 
(compelling-interest standard under Free Exercise Clause); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 
(Ohio 2000) (compelling-interest standard under state constitution). 
 230. Mark Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. 
CT. REV. 373, 382–83. 
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Witnesses231—and that non-Christians always lost.232 The critics chalk this 
up to the fact that judges are simply part of our “predominantly Christian 
nation.”233
But this attack on exemptions doctrine is unwarranted. There were only 
fifteen Supreme Court free exercise decisions before Smith, too small a 
data set to generate very strong conclusions. After Smith the Court 
protected animal sacrifices by the unfamiliar Afro-Caribbean religion of 
Santeria234 but ruled against a mainstream Catholic parish’s challenge to a 
landmark preservation ordinance.235 In the broader set of appellate 
decisions, non-Christian faiths won several times before Smith.236 And 
since Smith, courts have mandated exemptions for Muslims, Native 
Americans, Jews, and other minorities, whether under the Free Exercise 
Clause or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).237 Indeed, the 
most systematic regression analysis of religious freedom decisions, done 
by my colleague Greg Sisk and others, concludes that in lower federal 
courts from 1986 to 1995, “the proposition that minority religions 
experience a significantly lower success rate was found to be without 
empirical support.”238
 231. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. 
 232. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 246 (“Members of small Christian sects sometimes win and 
sometimes lose free exercise claims, but non-Christians never win.”); Sherry, supra note 4, at 506 
(“All these Christian sects can find solace in the Constitution, but the Constitution offers no protection 
for Jews in the military.”); Tushnet, supra note 230, at 381 (“[P]ut bluntly, the pattern is that 
sometimes Christians win but non-Christians never do.”). 
 233. James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 248 (1999) (explaining “that Christian judges should be more 
likely to be sympathetic to the plight of fellow Christians”). 
 234. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524–25 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 
723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469–70 (S.D. Fla. 1989)). 
 235. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (dismissing Church’s claim under 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act on ground that Act was unconstitutional). 
 236. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 n.40 (1994) (collecting cases). 
 237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (2000); see, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do 
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d. 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (relying on RFRA to exempt small 
sect’s sacramental use of tea containing hallucinogenic substance listed under federal drug laws); 
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (exempting Orthodox eruv, or 
demarcation of area in which pushing and carrying are religiously permitted to observant Jews, from 
city rule against attachments to utility poles); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 
359 (3d Cir. 1999) (exempting Muslim police officer from department rule against wearing beards); 
Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
 238. Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical 
Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (draft manuscript at 3, 
on file with author); see Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 164, at 562–67. 
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In addition, as I argued in Part II, the label of “Christian” is often too 
simplistic to reflect the reality of American religion. The “Christian” 
groups that the Supreme Court has protected—Amish, Seventh-Day 
Adventists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses—are most plausibly classified as 
“outsiders” and minorities.239 The most likely reason why non-Christian 
claims usually lose is that free exercise accommodation claims overall 
usually lose, including claims by mainstream Christians. The proper 
response is not to eliminate religious exemptions—which would almost 
certainly make minority faiths worse off—but to strengthen the 
exemptions so that minorities receive real protection.240
Thus the recognition of some constitutionally mandated exemptions is 
important to protecting and equalizing minority religions. But it is less 
clear what the standard for declaring exemptions should be. Current law 
offers two alternatives. First is the balancing test used under the Free 
Exercise Clause before Smith,241 which still applies in certain cases under 
federal religious freedom statutes and under state provisions both 
constitutional and statutory.242 Under this approach, any substantial burden 
by government on religious exercise must be justified as the least 
restrictive means of promoting a compelling or overriding governmental 
interest.243
The compelling-interest balancing test has been criticized, with some 
reason, for being too vague and prone to manipulation by judges.244 I 
concede that the open-ended nature of the compelling interest test could 
permit manipulation, conscious or unconscious, to grant claims by insider 
or familiar faiths while denying minority claims. But as I have just noted, 
this concern is not really borne out by the facts. Indeed, the regression 
analysis of religious-freedom decisions by Professor Sisk and his 
colleagues shows that most minority faiths fared no worse in federal court 
than larger faiths did—and that the two groups that fared most 
 239. Way & Burt, supra note 208, at 657 (treating these groups as marginal, and finding that free 
exercise victories tended to be for marginal groups). 
 240. McConnell, supra note 228, at 1152–53. 
 241. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 242. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2000) 
(applying to federal-law burdens on religion); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2004) (overriding burdens on religion from state and local zoning and 
landmarking laws and prison regulations); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS 
C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 196 (2002) (summarizing state constitutional rulings and 
state RFRAs). 
 243. See, e.g., RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 244. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 230; see also McConnell, supra note 228, at 1144 (calling the 
pre-Smith doctrine “poorly developed and unacceptably subjective”). 
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significantly worse than others were the stereotypically “mainstream” 
Catholics and Baptists.245
One explanation for these results is that the compelling interest test has 
components tilting strongly toward the prosecution of minority faiths and 
less toward the protection of majorities. Properly conceived, the test 
measures the government’s interest “at the margin”: by “the effect of 
excepting religious claimants from the legal provision,” not by “the 
importance of the provision in general.”246 That approach follows both 
from the text of RFRA-type statutes and from Wisconsin v. Yoder,247 the 
decision on which they are modeled.248 RFRA requires the government to 
show a compelling justification for “the application of the burden to the” 
claimant, not for the law in general; it thereby follows Yoder’s direction 
that the state had to prove “the impediment to [its] objectives that would 
flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption.”249
Under this marginal-cost analysis, the smaller the group being 
burdened, the harder it should be for the government to justify denying an 
exemption. Exemptions prompt the worry that granting one will invite a 
series of future claims whose cumulative effect on social interests will be 
damaging.250 But the smaller and more unconventional the group, the 
fewer the likely prospective claims. Critics also worry that exemptions 
will encourage self-interested behavior and create a constitutionally 
troubling incentive for people to practice religion or pretend to do so.251 
But the smaller and more countercultural the claimant, the less attractive 
her practice is likely to be to others. Where the practice is sufficiently 
attractive that too many exemption claims will follow, this can be taken 
into account in judging whether the state’s interest is compelling. 
 245. Sisk, supra note 238, draft at 15–16; Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 164, at 562–67. 
 246. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 311; 
see also Berg, supra note 236, at 40–41. 
 247. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 248. RFRA 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (stating that RFRA’s purpose is to restore the compelling 
interest of Yoder). 
 249. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. 
 250. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (relying on this argument to deny 
Amish claim for exemption from tax to which they objected); Smith, 494 U.S. at 916–17 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (rejecting this argument on facts of claim to engage in peyote use); Ira C. Lupu, Where 
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 950–
51 (1989); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 308, 312 (1991). 
 251. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1016–17 (1990) (noting the criticism as to some exemptions); 
Marshall, supra note 250, at 326 (arguing that exemptions make religion “the tool for fraudulent or 
specious claims”); Pepper, supra note 246, at 327–28. 
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Consider, for example, cases involving religious objections to elements 
of compulsory schooling. The Amish prevailed in Yoder in keeping their 
teenagers out of school,252 but in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of 
Education253 fundamentalist parents were refused the right to withdraw 
their children from particular classes or assignments they found 
objectionable.254 The court explained that the Amish were more insular 
and countercultural than were the fundamentalists.255 Yoder found that the 
Amish were uniquely burdened by compulsory schooling because they 
withdrew from society into “a separated agrarian community,” a showing 
“that probably few other religious groups could make.”256 Mozert noted 
that the fundamentalists wanted their children to attend school and 
participate in the broader society; it cited Yoder’s argument that 
“compulsory education [is more] necessary when its goal is the 
preparation of the child” not for life with the Amish, but “for life in 
modern society as the majority live.”257 In my view, Mozert was wrongly 
decided; the court should have recognized that continual forced exposure 
of the children to objectionable materials significantly burdened the 
families’ religious exercise, and that there were ways to accommodate 
both the families’ and the school’s interests.258 But Mozert illustrates how 
the compelling interest analysis logically tilts toward the smaller, more 
insular group. 
My colleague Professor Sisk, in interpreting the results of his empirical 
study, agrees that in judges’ views, “the larger the religious group, the 
greater the potential effect on governmental interests from 
accommodation, and therefore the higher (and [more] unacceptable) the 
costs to society in tolerating” the group’s behavior.259 He warns that this 
logic, taken to its conclusion, can make the compelling-interest analysis 
“short-hand for repressing religious conscience whenever it cannot easily 
be contained and isolated within a small sect.”260 I wholeheartedly agree 
that free exercise rights for “mainstream” faiths should remain vigorous as 
 252. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. 
 253. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). 
 254. Id. at 1065. 
 255. Id. at 1067 (noting that while the Amish “attempt to shield their children from all worldly 
influences,” the Mozert parents “want their children to acquire all the skills required to live in modern 
society [and] also want to have them excused from exposure to some ideas they find offensive”). 
 256. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222, 235–36. 
 257. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222). 
 258. Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 550–57 (1999). 
 259. Sisk, supra note 238, draft at 23. 
 260. Id. 
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well. Recall that the Free Exercise Clause protects all faiths, not just 
religious minorities.261 My point here is only a relative one: even though 
larger faiths should retain vigorous free exercise rights, their claims do 
logically tend to implicate government interests to a greater degree than do 
the claims of minority faiths.262
The alternative route to free exercise exemptions is to require that the 
government exempt religious conscience from legal burdens when 
exemptions are already provided for comparable secular interests. Douglas 
Laycock has described this as a “most favored nation” approach, because 
it requires that, absent a compelling interest, religious conscience receive 
the same solicitude as the most protected secular interests.263 This method 
has shielded the practices of classic minority faiths in several cases. It has 
protected a Muslim police officer’s right to wear a beard, notwithstanding 
a departmental grooming rule, when beards were permitted for officers 
with skin conditions.264 It has protected Native American religious 
practitioners’ rights to possess and use owl feathers for ritual purposes, 
notwithstanding endangered species laws, when researchers and 
taxidermists were already permitted to possess feathers for their secular 
purposes.265 It has protected Orthodox Jews’ ability to use markers to 
indicate the area within which they are permitted to push baby carriages or 
use walkers, when other groups could similarly use city utility poles for 
their purposes.266 The minority-protective nature of this approach is also 
not surprising. The legislature is likely to give exemptions for familiar 
interests, and an obvious way to shield religious minorities is to require 
that the same solicitude extend to them as well. 
Which of the two exemptions tests applies—the RFRA approach or the 
“other exemptions” approach—probably matters less than the attitude the 
court brings to either test. Professor Samuel Levine has offered a number 
 261. See supra Part II.A, notes 103–13 and accompanying text. 
 262. Professor Sisk offers other explanations for the lower success rate of Catholics and Baptists 
in court: (1) judges may think that these groups can protect themselves politically and do not need 
judicial assistance; and (2) some judges are hostile to the substantive positions of these groups. Sisk, 
supra note 238, at 17–23. I agree with these warnings—especially the warning that judges should not 
simplemindedly classify a group as “majority” or “insider” and overlook that it may be on the 
“outside” of the dominant culture in the relevant geographic or institutional setting. See supra Part 
II.B. 
 263. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49. 
 264. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 265. Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
 266. Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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of recommendations, which I would simply like to second, for how courts 
can “conside[r] the minority religious perspective.”267
First, Levine argues, courts should analogize unfamiliar religious 
practices to familiar ones, to help the majority understand the importance 
of the practice to the minority.268 For example, the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
practice of preaching and distributing tracts in the streets can be 
analogized to more traditional church sermons,269 and the use of peyote at 
Native American Church rituals can be analogized to the consumption of 
wine at the Catholic mass.270 Related to this, courts should approach 
religious freedom cases from the viewpoint of the minority. For example, 
Justice Brennan in Braunfeld v. Brown271 specifically adopted “the point of 
view of the individuals whose liberty is—concededly—curtailed by 
[Sunday-closing] enactments.”272 To understand and communicate the 
effects of laws on religious minorities, courts should turn to narratives: 
minority adherents’ own descriptions of how things are for them. For 
example, the Court quoted Edward Schempp on why merely exempting 
his children from the Lord’s Prayer rituals in public schools still left them 
vulnerable to pressure from their peers;273 and Justice Brennan described 
the predicament that Captain Simcha Goldman faced when military 
regulations prevented him from covering his head in humility before 
God.274
Finally, Levine emphasizes, courts should be alert to avoid devices of 
decision that tend to work against minority faiths. They should reject 
annoyance or distaste as grounds for restricting religious practice, as the 
Court eventually realized in the Jehovah’s Witnesses cases.275 Judges 
should also look behind form to the actual effect of the law on minorities, 
which can often be hidden behind familiar categories that reflect the 
 267. Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law 
Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL. RTS. J. 153, 155 (1996). 
 268. Id. at 165. 
 269. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 621 
(1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“While perhaps not so orthodox as the oral sermon, the use of 
religious books is an old, recognized and effective mode of worship and means of proselytizing. . . . 
The mind rebels at the thought that a minister of any of the old established churches could be made to 
pay fees to the community before entering the pulpit.”). 
 270. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 n.6 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 271. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 272. Id. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 273. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1963). 
 274. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 514 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that 
Goldman “was asked to violate the tenets of his faith virtually every minute of every work day”). 
 275. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940). 
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assumptions of the majority. As Justice Brennan put it in the Goldman 
case: 
Definitions of necessity are influenced by decisionmakers’ 
experiences and values. As a consequence, in a pluralistic society 
such as ours, institutions dominated by a majority are inevitably, if 
inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and values of minorities when 
these needs and values differ from those of the majority. . . . A 
critical function of the Religion Clauses [i]s to protect the rights of 
members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian 
social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as 
unimportant, because unfamiliar.276
2. Specific Legislative Exemptions 
Accommodations of religion may also be provided by the legislature’s 
discretion, in the text of a specific law. The Religion Clause question is at 
what point, if ever, such exemptions amount to impermissible favoritism 
for religion. The Court has held several times that the Establishment 
Clause permits legislatures to remove legally imposed burdens on religion 
even where the Free Exercise Clause does not compel it.277 But the Court 
has occasionally struck down exemptions that were not necessary to 
remove significant burdens, that imposed excessive burdens on others, or 
that unjustifiably favored one religious sect over other sects similarly 
situated.278
Specific legislative exemptions, like constitutionally mandated 
exemptions, will have some tendency to protect religious minorities. If the 
general terms of a democratically enacted law tend to reflect the majority’s 
views and practices, then an exemption will tend to address the needs of a 
minority. Examples include the statutory accommodations of peyote use 
 276. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 523–24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 277. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (indicating approval of legislative exemptions of sacramental peyote 
use); Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335–38 (1987) (approving exemption for 
religious organization from laws against religious discrimination in employment); Gillette v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 437, 440 (1971) (approving exemption from military service for conscientious 
objectors to all wars). 
 278. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down 
special school district created solely to educate disabled children of Satmar Hasidic sect); Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (invalidating sales-tax exemption limited to religious 
publications); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating provision imposing 
absolute requirement on employers to accommodate employees’ chosen Sabbath). 
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that the Court referred to approvingly in Smith,279 and the exemption from 
the draft laws for those who “by religious training and belief” are opposed 
to all wars.280 Even a statutory accommodation that the Court struck 
down—the special school district for the disabled Satmar Hasidic children 
of Kiryas Joel, New York—likely protected an insular minority from the 
pressures imposed by secular society. Before the statutory 
accommodation, the Satmar children had to receive special education 
services in a public-school environment whose modern, secular features 
concededly had caused them “panic, fear, and trauma.”281 That the 
legislature might sometimes accommodate even small, insular groups is 
not surprising given, among other things, the political-organizational 
advantages of such groups noted in Part I.282
Some commentators, however, worry that exemptions by the 
legislature are inherently majoritarian. A leading critic, Ira Lupu, has 
warned that “[c]ustomary practices are likely to be accommodated,” 
“unusual ones are less likely to be so treated,” and the legislative 
distinctions “will frequently rest on religious prejudice, ignorance, or other 
unacceptable grounds.”283 This concern is legitimate given the basically 
majoritarian orientation of legislatures. Moreover, even a legislature that is 
responsive to minority groups can favor those groups that are politically 
savvy and disfavor those that are so small or oppressed that they cannot 
organize politically. 
These concerns are real, but to eliminate discretionary religious 
exemptions is an unwarranted and misguided response. Legislative 
exemptions often protect true minority groups and their practices. To 
invalidate large numbers of such exemptions would be to elevate technical 
equality over the positive liberty of religious minorities, as Part II 
cautioned against doing.284 A far better approach is to use constitutional 
rules as backstops to legislative action, to ensure that small or less well 
organized groups receive exemptions as well. The first such constitutional 
rule is that “sectarian discrimination is presumptively unacceptable. Any 
accommodation for faith-healing, for example, thus cannot be limited to 
respectable, educated, middle and upper-middle class sects like the 
Christian Scientists, but must be extended to their grubbier or less well-
 279. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 280. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 456 (j) (1958). 
 281. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692. 
 282. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text; see also Ackerman, supra note 45, at 724–28. 
 283. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary 
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 586–87 (1991). 
 284. See supra Part II.C. 
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known counterparts.”285 A legislative exemption that has been 
unjustifiably limited to one religious sect can be judicially extended to 
others, as the Court did in the case of Minnesota charitable-solicitation 
laws whose exemptions were drafted to exclude “new religions” such as 
the Unification Church.286 The decision, Larson v. Valente, makes clear 
that discrimination between similarly situated religious sects violates “the 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause” and is subject to strict 
scrutiny.287
The second constitutional backstop is the judicially mandated free 
exercise exemption itself. As Michael McConnell has pointed out, the 
requirement of equality between sects is insufficient to protect minority 
adherents’ ability to practice their faith: it may ensure not “that all 
religious faiths receive equal solicitude,” but rather “that all receive equal 
indifference.”288 Moreover, legislatures can favor majority groups “by 
inaction just as it can by action”: 
[Legislatures] can simply refrain from passing laws that burden the 
exercise of religion by mainstream groups, and there is nothing the 
Establishment Clause can do about this. In the end, the only hope 
for achieving denominational neutrality is a vigorous Free Exercise 
Clause.289
Given the possible inequalities from legislative exemptions, judicially 
mandated exemptions provide an important backstop. But because judicial 
exemptions are not always vigorously enforced—and are not required in 
many free exercise cases after Employment Division v. Smith—
discretionary legislative exemptions also play an important role in 
protecting religious minorities. 
3. Protection of Atheism and Agnosticism 
A final recurring question concerning free exercise protection is 
whether it should encompass not only those who believe in a theistic God, 
but those who specifically disbelieve: atheists and explicit agnostics. Of 
course, atheists and agnostics, like all other citizens, receive protection 
from state-imposed religion because of the Establishment Clause. But the 
 285. Lupu, supra note 283, at 585–86. 
 286. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 287. Id. at 244. 
 288. McConnell, supra note 228, at 1132. 
 289. Id. 
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question is whether the Free Exercise Clause extends to these systems of 
nonbelief, protecting them even from nominally secular laws that conflict 
with their conscience. The Supreme Court has suggested that it should,290 
but has never settled the question directly. 
If protection of religious minorities is the dominant Religion Clause 
criterion, then atheists and agnostics should receive free exercise 
protection. Atheists and agnostics hold explicit positions on a central—
perhaps the central—religious question, the existence of a deity, and their 
position is quite uncommon. As I noted earlier, more than 90 percent of 
Americans continue to believe in God or a universal spirit.291 Therefore, 
those who explicitly deny that a deity exists, and those who explicitly deny 
that we could ever know if one does, make up two of the smaller religious 
minorities around the nation. As political commentator Michael Kinsley 
observed a few years ago, “the noisy village atheist, the missionary of 
unbelief, is a virtually extinct social type.”292
Free exercise protection for atheists and agnostics means, most 
obviously, that government cannot restrict meetings of their organizations, 
suppress distribution of their literature, or forbid them from holding office. 
But in addition, under a minority-protection approach, atheists and 
agnostics should be included in religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws, as the Supreme Court held under a statutory exemption in 
the Vietnam-era draft cases.293
The difficulty with exemption claims by atheists and agnostics lies not 
in whether their views are religious, but in whether their conduct actually 
follows from the demands of those views. The nonexistence of a theistic 
god or a spiritual world may free a person to engage in acts that the deity 
would have forbidden; but it is less frequent that this nonexistence itself 
would require or motivate a person to act in a certain way. Only such a 
connection—the anti-theist belief itself as a motivation for behavior—
provides the basis for a free exercise exemption claim. For this reason, 
religious exemptions for atheists and agnostics might not be frequent. 
On the other hand, from a minority-rights perspective, the required 
connection between the atheist belief and conduct ought not to be overly 
tight. As Professor Laycock has pointed out, in some cases theistic 
 290. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (extending protection for 
“religious training and belief” under draft-exemption statute to those with nontheistic beliefs on 
matters of “ultimate concern”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (including “Secular 
Humanism” among religions that “do not teach . . . a belief in the existence of God”). 
 291. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 292. Michael Kinsley, Martyr Complex, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, at 1. 
 293. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Seeger, 380 U.S. 163. 
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believers receive protection for principles of conscientious conduct even 
though the principle is not an official tenet of their denomination and even 
though they may have derived it in part from reading secular or other 
religious sources—for example, a Christian pacifist influenced by the 
writings of Gandhi or a secular critic of war.294 Nevertheless, the religious 
claimant—and therefore the atheist or agnostic claimant—still needs to 
articulate some connection, even if indirect, between the principle of 
conscience and the belief on a religious matter. 
The draft cases themselves probably met this criterion: conduct that 
was not just permitted by a belief in God’s nonexistence, but followed 
from the belief. Atheists or agnostic draft objectors can plausibly assert 
that the nonexistence of a theistic god or an afterlife means that this life is 
of utmost importance, and therefore that the worst thing a person can do is 
end another’s life. Whether or not the objectors in the Vietnam cases made 
such an assertion, it should—under a minority protection approach—
provide the basis for a religious exemption under either a statutory 
accommodation provision or the Free Exercise Clause. 
B. Religion in Public Schools and Other Government Institutions 
A second major category of Religion Clause issues involves religious 
activities or elements in public schools and other governmental 
institutions. The Court in these cases has drawn a sharp distinction 
“between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment 
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”295 Government may not speak 
religiously itself or promote religious ideas over other ideas—at least not 
in the public schools, although the doctrine is more complicated in non-
school settings.296 But private religious groups have the right to meet on 
school grounds on the same terms as nonreligious groups.297 This 
government/private distinction makes sense under a minority-protection 
approach. 
 294. Laycock, supra note 2, at 335. 
 295. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 296. Compare Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayers and 
chaplaincies), with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (striking down placement of 
créche alone in prominent place in city hall). 
 297. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Mergens, 496 U.S. 226; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
(1981). 
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1. Government-Sponsored Religion 
In striking down government sponsorship of religious activities and 
speech, the Court has accurately emphasized minority rights. Government-
sponsored religious speech and activities clash with a minority-protection 
emphasis in two ways. 
First, such practices are inherently likely to reflect the majority’s 
religious views and disregard or conflict with the minority’s. Government 
sponsorship means that the content of religious expression is chosen by a 
majoritarian body, almost inevitably with an eye toward which religious 
sentiments are acceptable to a broad majority. These can include familiar 
religious features like the Lord’s Prayer or the Ten Commandments,298 or 
an exercise composed by elected officials themselves.299
The majoritarian dynamic also operated in Doe v. Santa Fe 
Independent School District,300 even though in that case a student chose 
whether to deliver a prayer at high school football games.301 The student 
speaker was elected by the student body, giving the majority control over 
who would formulate and deliver the message.302 It is not hard to imagine 
the question of whether to give a prayer becoming the focal point in the 
election, with candidates campaigning on whether or not to pray, thereby 
putting the decision about prayer itself effectively in the hands of the 
majority. In this context, the Court emphasized that “the majoritarian 
process . . . guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never 
prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced. . . . [The] student 
election does nothing to protect minority views but rather places the 
students who hold such views at the mercy of the majority.”303 A minority-
protection approach rejects policies that, although neutral in theory, have a 
structure that favors the majority’s views. 
Under a minority-protection approach, the Court has also been correct 
to refuse to permit religious exercises in schools whenever they are 
“nonsectarian” and encompass many faiths through generalized religious 
language. General references to God still exclude minority religious 
 298. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of Ten Commandments in schoolrooms); 
Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Lord’s Prayer). 
 299. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) (involving a “nonsectarian” prayer composed 
by state school board). 
 300. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 301. Id. at 297–98. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 304. The Court then quoted Barnette’s proposition that “fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Id. at 304–05 (quoting West Virginia 
St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
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positions. Indeed, as the polls cited above indicate,304 a nonspecific, 
nondemanding theism may be the quintessential majority position in 
American religion today. References to God conflict with atheist and 
agnostic views as well as non-theistic religions, all of which remain 
distinct minorities in America. And when theistic references are 
generalized and vague, they may offend highly particularistic theists, those 
who think, for example, that no prayer has value unless it specifically 
invokes Allah or Jesus. In modern America, characterized by interreligious 
contact and cooperation, those who take theological offense at generalized 
prayers are likely to be the minority; they exemplify the non-acculturated, 
uncompromising “sects” that courts should protect.305 Thus, under a 
minority-protection approach the Court was correct in Lee v. Weisman306 
to hold that government may not “establish an official or civic religion as a 
means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific 
creeds.”307 As Weisman recognized, the fact that the state’s religious 
exercise aims to be “civic or nonsectarian rather than pertaining to one 
sect” may, because it reduces the number of dissenters, actually 
“increas[e] their sense of isolation and affront.”308
Second, the Court has justifiably recognized that official religious 
exercises, especially in the public schools, put dissenters in a very difficult 
position. The Court’s decisions address the matter from the minority’s 
perspective, as I suggested earlier was proper under a minority-protection 
approach.309 Weisman, for example, rejected the argument that an objector 
forced to stand silently during a graduation-ceremony invocation was not 
being asked to participate in the prayer: 
What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable 
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a 
school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an 
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious 
orthodoxy. . . . [G]iven our social conventions, a reasonable 
dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise 
signified her own participation or approval of it.310
 304. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 205–10 and accompanying text. 
 306. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 307. Id. at 590. 
 308. Id. at 594. 
 309. See supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text. 
 310. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592–93. 
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Earlier decisions also cited objecting parents’ testimony and recognized 
that an official religious exercise in school could pressure them and their 
children even if they formally were able to opt out.311
Weisman made these minority-protective points through an expansive 
understanding of what actions were coercive. Earlier decisions had 
demanded even more of the government, requiring that it not just avoid 
coercion, but be “neutral” toward religion or not “advance” or “endorse” 
it.312 The no-coercion test, applied broadly as in Weisman, can address one 
of the two chief goals of the minority-protection approach: preventing 
actual pressure on minorities from majoritarian government. But the other 
key goal—that of ensuring citizens of various faiths equal status in the 
government’s eye—can only be accomplished through a more rigorous 
test like non-endorsement. That test’s originator, Justice O’Connor, 
emphasizes that government endorsement of a religious view “sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they 
are insiders, favored members of the political community.”313
In contrast, the no-coercion test does not directly capture this concern, 
however broadly it is applied, and it cannot plausibly extend to all 
situations in which the government can elevate one religion and denigrate 
others. The prayer at graduation exercises is coercive because of the 
practical importance of attending the event; so too, arguably, the football 
game prayer in Santa Fe. But other nonmandatory school events are harder 
 311. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (noting “the indirect coercive pressure upon 
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion”). In Schempp, the Court 
quoted the trial court’s summary of testimony: 
Edward Schempp, the children’s father, testified that after careful consideration he had 
decided that he should not have Roger or Donna excused from attendance at these morning 
ceremonies. Among his reasons were the following. He said that he thought his children 
would be “labeled as ‘odd balls’” before their teachers and classmates every school day; that 
children, like Roger’s and Donna’s classmates, were liable “to lump all particular religious 
difference(s) or religious objections (together) as ‘atheism’” and that today the word 
“atheism” is often connected with “atheistic communism,” and has “very bad” connotations, 
such as “un-American” or “anti-Red,” [sic] with overtones of possible immorality. Mr. 
Schempp pointed out that due to the events of the morning exercises following in rapid 
succession, the Bible reading, the Lord’s Prayer, the Flag Salute, and the announcements, 
excusing his children from the Bible reading would mean that probably they would miss 
hearing the announcements so important to children. He testified also that if Roger and Donna 
were excused from Bible reading they would have to stand in the hall outside their 
“homeroom” and that this carried with it the imputation of punishment for bad conduct. 
Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1963). 
 312. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (neutrality, no advancement); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989) (Blackmun, J., for the majority) (no endorsement). 
 313. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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to call coercive, as are displays or ceremonies “beyond the context of a 
closed environment” like elementary or secondary schools.314 Even Justice 
Kennedy, the author of Weisman, made clear that state-erected créches or 
other religious displays are not coercive because “[p]assersby . . . are free 
to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when 
they disagree with any other form of government speech.”315 In such cases 
the non-coercion rationale “leaves the state free to embark on a program of 
religious approval and disapproval,” almost certainly in favor of faiths 
broadly acceptable to the majority.316
Under a minority-protection approach, the non-endorsement test too 
should emphasize the perspective of those in the minority faith. The 
nativity scene included in a city-sponsored Christmas display may appear 
to many people simply to acknowledge the origins of the Christmas 
holiday, as the Court held in Lynch v. Donnelly.317 But to a non-Christian, 
the créche is likely to appear not just to recognize Christ’s birth but to 
celebrate it. And the very fact that the majoritarian city government has 
chosen Christmas as the holiday to celebrate reminds everyone that 
adherents of non-Christian faiths are in the minority.318 If the non-
endorsement test aims to protect those outside the majority faith from 
receiving a message that they are “outsiders [to] the political 
community,”319 then their perceptions should receive significant weight. 
That does not mean deferring to any ultra-sensitive person who thinks a 
government display favors or celebrates a particular religious view.320 But 
it does mean, in Justice Stevens’ words, giving serious attention to “the 
 314. Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The Supreme Court’s Coercion Test: Insufficient Constitutional 
Protection for America’s Religious Minorities, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 246, 254 (2001). 
 315. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 316. Peterson, supra note 314, at 256. Likewise, one might argue that at a state university 
commencement, the coercion to express approval of a prayer is attenuated because the audience is 
older and there are many more persons there. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 
1997); Tanford v. Brand, 932 F. Supp. 1139, 1144 (S.D. Ind. 1996), aff’d, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 
1997). But to approve the prayer allows the state to embrace and promote majoritarian religion. 
 317. 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984); id. at 705 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 318. Indeed, the real question in Lynch from a minority-protection standpoint is why the 
government is celebrating Christmas in the first place. It is one thing to accommodate employees’ 
beliefs by closing government operations on the holiday, and another thing affirmatively to celebrate 
it. 
 319. Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 320. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular 
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of viewing symbols of a faith to which 
they do not subscribe.”).  
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perspective of a reasonable person who may not share the particular 
religious belief that [the display] expresses.”321
But in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,322 Stevens 
applied this perspective to advocate striking down a display erected not by 
the government, but by a private group that itself constituted a despised 
minority: the Ku Klux Klan.323 Even under a minority-protection 
approach, the Establishment Clause should not bar equal permission for 
privately erected displays, as I will argue shortly.324 While government-
sponsored displays are inherently likely to favor majority faiths, the right 
to engage in private religious expression in public settings may be 
essential for small, countercultural religious groups. Of course, if the 
government gives special favoritism or pride of place to a religious 
display, the fact that it was erected by a private group should not matter, as 
the Court held in ACLU v. County of Allegheny.325 In such cases, 
majoritarian government’s choice still inheres, not in the display itself, but 
in the government’s favored placement of it. 
A broad disapproval of non-coercive religious exercises and symbols 
sponsored by government would strike down many of the practices of 
American “civil religion.” Such results obviously clash with an approach 
that interprets the Establishment Clause primarily according to the specific 
contemplations of the Framers or to longstanding traditions. But these 
results do seem to follow if the primary emphasis is on protecting and 
equalizing minority faiths. 
2. Do Government Acknowledgments of Religion Help Religious 
Minorities? 
Yet there is a counterargument: that some non-coercive religious 
statements by government are consistent with, indeed important to, the 
protection of religious minorities. According to this argument, religious 
 321. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 322. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 323. Id. at 799–800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If a reasonable person could perceive a government 
endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to be used as 
a forum for that display. No less stringent rule can adequately protect nonadherents from a well-
grounded perception that their sovereign supports a faith to which they do not subscribe.”). Under the 
facts—the display of a cross in a public square that a number of other organizations used for 
expression—the likelihood of any reasonable perception of state endorsement was minimal. 
 324. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 325. 492 U.S. at 600 (“[T]he Establishment Clause does not limit only the religious content of the 
government’s own communications. It also prohibits the government’s support and promotion of 
religious communications by religious organizations.”). 
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freedom itself—for minority as well as other faiths—rests ultimately on a 
religious rationale, and government must be able to endorse this rationale 
if it is going to explain and solidify our societal commitment to religious 
freedom. 
Steven Smith, for example, argues that the “principal” foundation for 
religious freedom in America has been a “religious justification”: that 
duties to God or a higher reality are more important than duties to the state 
or society, and that these duties must be left to the individual conscience 
because faith coerced or influenced by government cannot be real or 
effective.326 James Madison, for example, began his landmark Memorial 
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments by arguing that “the 
duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage . . . as he believes 
to be acceptable to him” is “precedent both in order of time and degree of 
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”327 Thomas Jefferson’s preamble 
to Virginia’s 1786 Religious Freedom Statute asserts that “Almighty God 
hath created the mind free” and that “all attempts to influence it by 
temporal punishments or burdens . . . are a departure from the plan of the 
Holy Author of our religion.”328 Professor Smith argues that such religious 
rationales not only constituted the primary historical justification for 
religious freedom in America, but also offer the only convincing 
normative justification for religious freedom as a distinctive right today. 
Secular rationales, he argues at length, cannot explain why religion is 
different from, and therefore more entitled to protection than, any other 
human activity.329 Indeed, the Supreme Court continues to ground its 
constitutional rulings on religious freedom in part on religious 
propositions.330
 326. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 149, 149, 154–55 (1991). 
 327. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments ¶ 1 (1785), 
reprinted in MCCONNELL, GARVEY & BERG, supra note 242, at 63, 63. 
 328. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 2003). 
 329. Smith, supra note 326, at 196–223. 
 330. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (religious liberty “derives [in part] from 
the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by 
the faithful”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) (“[R]eligion is too personal, too sacred, too 
holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”). For other commentary setting forth 
the religious rationale for religious freedom, see, for example, John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal 
Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996); McConnell, supra note 
65; Michael S. Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597 (1997) (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 
(1997)); Gregory C. Sisk, Stating the Obvious: Protecting Religion for Religion’s Sake, 47 DRAKE L. 
REV. 45 (1998). 
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However, the religious justification for religious freedom is 
undermined by the broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause that 
prohibits government from endorsing or expressing any religious 
propositions—that is, precisely the broad Establishment Clause 
interpretation that we have hypothesized is necessary to protect religious 
minorities. A government that cannot endorse any religious statement 
cannot explicitly endorse the religious justification for religious freedom. 
The ironic result, as Professor Smith points out, is to render Jefferson’s 
statute—a landmark in the development of religious liberty—
unconstitutional because of its claims about “almighty God” and “the Holy 
author of our religion.”331 In Smith’s words, “[o]ur constitutional 
commitment to religious freedom has been disabled from acknowledging 
the principal historical justification for its existence.”332 He further shows 
how the loss of this justification has directly undermined free exercise 
rights in Employment Division v. Smith. The Smith majority opinion 
rejected strong free exercise protection on the ground that it would 
produce anarchy with each believer “a law unto himself.”333 But if God 
exists and makes demands on human beings, the believer stands under a 
duty to God rather than to himself. The Court’s inability to contemplate or 
articulate this rationale, Professor Smith argues, stems from its belief that 
it is not permitted to recognize the possible existence of God.334
A similar argument was raised in Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow,335 in which the Court confronted but sidestepped the question 
whether public schools could conduct recitations of the Pledge of 
Allegiance with its phrase “one nation, under God.”336 An amicus brief by 
the Christian Legal Society argued that the statement that the nation is 
“under God” reflects principles of limited government and human 
rights.337 It can be powerfully argued that rights have the greatest security 
 331. Smith, supra note 326, at 193–96. 
 332. Id. at 188. 
 333. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). 
 334. Smith, supra note 326, at 236–37. 
 335. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
 336. Id. (holding that father lacked standing to challenge recitation in his daughter’s school when 
girl’s mother, who supported her saying the Pledge, had final decisionmaking authority in cases of 
conflict under state court custody order). 
 337. Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society et al. at 5, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), available at 2003 WL 23051988. The brief cites the committee 
report for the 1954 law adding the phrase to the Pledge, which states, among other things, that the 
phrase reflects “the belief that the human person . . . was created by God and endowed by Him with 
certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may usurp.” H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 1–2 (1954), 
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340. For an elaboration of this argument (with misgivings as 
applied to recitations of the Pledge in schools), see Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the 
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in a society that believes that they stem from a source higher than any 
human authority. Without that foundation, those in power can always ask 
why they should respect the dignity of those “small or powerless groups” 
who “can do little to harm [the powerful] in return.”338 Thus, as Michael 
Perry has argued, no argument in America for individual rights, especially 
minority rights, “will begin to have the power of an argument that appeals 
at least in part to the conviction that all human beings are sacred and 
‘created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
Rights.’”339
If these arguments are correct, religious freedom as an inalienable right 
itself rests significantly on the belief in a God who places human 
conscience beyond the reach of human authority. If that is so, then 
religious minorities may actually be harmed by broad Establishment 
Clause holdings disabling government from acknowledging the existence 
of God or endorsing even the general religious proposition that all human 
beings were created by God. Although such state endorsements may make 
some religious minorities (such as atheists) feel excluded in the short run, 
the argument goes, in the long run they are necessary to ground the 
commitment to religious freedom—and teach the basis for that 
commitment to the children who must carry it forward in the future. The 
weakening of this commitment hurts vulnerable religious minorities more 
than anyone. 
Similar arguments have come from a few voices among minority 
religions, particularly American Jews. In the early 1960s, sociologist and 
theologian Will Herberg defended school prayers, “under God” in the 
Pledge, and other religious exercises and ceremonials on the ground that 
the state must “constantly remin[d] itself and the people” that “it is subject 
to a majesty beyond all earthly majesties,” or else it will inevitably tend to 
“se[t] itself up as its own highest majesty.”340 The lesson of Nazism, he 
argued, was that such a government was dangerous for Jews.341 Other 
Jewish critics of a highly secularized government agreed that 
Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003). 
 338. Id. at 62 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 32–35 
(1998)). 
 339. PERRY, supra note 338, at 34–35. 
 340. Will Herberg, Religion and Public Life, NAT’L. REV., July 30, 1962, reprinted in HERBERG, 
supra note 99, at 215, 216–17. 
 341. Herberg wrote: 
Ultimately, man finds the autonomy which secularism offers him an intolerable burden, and 
he tends to throw it off in favor of some new heteronomy of race or nation, of party or state, 
that the idolatrous substitute faiths of the time hold out to him. In such idolatrous cultures, the 
Jew in the world is inevitably the chosen victim; the lesson of history and contemporary 
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American Jews required a society in which Christians remained true 
to their faith. Jewish history, particularly persecution at the hands of 
Nazis and Communists, taught that Jews fared best in ‘God-fearing’ 
nations. Indeed, the Chofetz Chaim, a renowned Talmudist and 
moralist in prewar Poland, refused to ride in a carriage whose driver 
did not cross himself before the crucifixes along the roads.342
Critics also argued that the secularization of government and society 
would contribute to the secularization of Jewish life itself—destroying, in 
their view, the identity of Jews as a religious minority.343
Evidence supporting these arguments appears in some current 
controversies where religious communities have mounted the strongest 
defense of the freedom of believers of other faiths. Consider the French 
government’s ban on students in state schools wearing religious clothing, 
apparently motivated by the desire to ban Muslim girls from wearing 
headscarves.344 To justify this restriction of wholly peaceful religious 
expression by a religious minority, France relies on the principle of laicite: 
that the schools must be wholly secular.345 Meanwhile, Muslim students 
are free to wear headscarves in France’s Catholic schools, which 
apparently value the dignity of a minority’s religious choices more than 
the secular state does.346 America’s understanding of religious freedom, 
because it is less secularist than France’s, would almost certainly forbid 
public schools to single out peaceful religious expression for 
prohibition.347 Likewise, among the strongest proponents of general free 
experience seems clear on this head. The way of the Jew is not and never will be easy; it will 
certainly not be made any the easier by his throwing in his lot with an increasingly total 
secularism, which both invites and is helpless to withstand the demonic idolatries of our time. 
Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict Over Church and State: A Divisive Threat to Our Democracy?, 
reprinted in HERBERG, supra note 340, at 187, 208–09. 
 342. COHEN, supra note 43, at 182 (quoting Michael Wyschogrod, Second Thoughts on America, 
5 TRADITION 29 (Fall 1962)). 
 343. Rabbi Seymour Siegel, for example, warned after the first school-prayer decision that “[i]f 
we completely desacralize our culture . . . we will be in danger of creating a kind of bland, common 
Americanism which in the end will progressively wear away Jewish consciousness and commitment.” 
COHEN, supra note 43, at 182–83. 
 344. Elaine Sciolino, Ban Religious Attire in School, French Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2003, at A1. 
 345. Elaine Sciolino, France Has a State Religion: Secularism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at D4. 
 346. E.J. Dionne, Jr., In France, Scarves and Secularism, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2003, at A21, 
available at 2003 WL 71034909. 
 347. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that 
elementary school’s act of singling out religious club for exclusion from after-hours use of classrooms 
violated First Amendment); Steve Barnes, Oklahoma: School District Settles Suit Over Muslim Head 
Scarf, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A20 (describing school district’s retreat from banning headscarf 
worn by female Muslim student). 
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exercise protection since Smith have been conservative religious groups, 
often in support of religions with which they disagree.348
This makes for a serious argument that some government endorsements 
of religion protect rather than harm religious minorities in the long run. 
What can be said in response? First, the argument applies only to 
government religious statements that are directly tied to political 
statements about human rights—in the way that “under God” is embedded 
in the Pledge of Allegiance, a statement of the nation’s aspiration to 
“liberty and justice.” Only in such contexts do religious statements directly 
serve the purpose of grounding religious freedom as a human right. The 
argument provides far less defense for official prayers, scripture readings, 
and other acts that operate primarily as worship activities rather than 
political assertions.349
Second, even granting the possible long-term protective effects of 
certain government religious endorsements, their direct, immediate effect 
is the opposite: they put the government behind the majority’s religious 
views and make many in the minority feel ostracized. In evaluating 
government endorsements from a minority-protection standpoint, we may 
be wise to give this direct harm to minorities greater weight than the 
potential long-term benefits, unless the potential benefits are quite certain 
and cannot be achieved by any other means. 
Finally, although the religious bases for human rights are undoubtedly 
important, government has means to expose students to them without 
resorting to full-fledged endorsements of religious propositions. Schools 
can teach young people about the religious rationales for religious freedom 
and other human rights by presenting those rationales in an objective 
rather than a devotional manner. The school can teach children that 
historically, and for many citizens today, religious freedom and other 
rights have rested on belief in God—which is different from teaching 
children that they should believe in God. It is questionable whether much 
is lost when the school refrains from direct inculcation of the belief. 
Devotional teaching by public schools is unlikely to produce real faith in 
 348. For example, the Christian Legal Society was active in legislative effort to pass versions of 
RFRA in the states, and recently, with other conservative organizations, it filed an amicus brief in the 
Tenth Circuit supporting the right of small sect, under RFRA, to ingest a tea with a hallucinogenic 
substance as part of its worship ceremonies. See Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society et al., 
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao De Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), available at http://www.clsnet.org/clrfPages/amicus/UDV.pdf. 
 349. See, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 478 (9th Cir. 2003) (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (defending Pledge and distinguishing it from school 
prayers and other “religious acts”), rev’d for lack of standing, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
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any significant number of students. A common proposition across various 
American theories of religious freedom is that true religious faith does not 
grow or thrive easily under the pressure or influence, even the positive 
influence, of government.350 A non-devotional but fair presentation of 
religious propositions still serves the important goals of informing students 
about the religious rationale for human rights—its historical and current 
significance—and avoiding what Justice Goldberg once called a “passive 
. . . hostility” to religious ideas.351 For these reasons, if protection of 
minorities is the overriding goal of the Religion Clauses, religious 
statements or exercises by government should still be viewed with great 
caution. 
3. Private Religious Speech and Activity 
On the other hand, a minority-protection approach should be much 
more hospitable to religious speech in public institutions when it is done 
solely on the initiative of individuals, and is not sponsored by government. 
Religious minorities need protection from more than just government 
promotion of other religions. Minority adherents engage in their own 
religious speech and activity that needs protection. And their speech will 
be particularly prone to restriction by democratic, majoritarian 
government. 
Private speech differs from government sponsored speech in crucial 
respects. What the government sponsors will tend to have a majoritarian 
cast, or at least tend to exclude those ideas offensive or irritating to the 
majority. Equal protection for private religious speech, by contrast, can 
extend as well to minority and outsider views. Indeed, it may be 
particularly important for such views. 
The protection of religious expression by private actors should extend 
to speech that occurs in public institutions, including the public schools. 
Current law provides that when the school opens an opportunity for 
students or other private groups to engage in expression, it must not refuse 
that opportunity to any group based on the content of its expression, 
including religious content.352 This “equal access” approach has been 
criticized on the ground that allowing religious speech in schools is the 
detrimental to religious minorities. Professor Ruti Teitel, for example, has 
objected that when student religious groups are permitted to meet in 
 350. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
 351. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963). 
 352. See cases cited supra note 297. 
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school classrooms, “government—a majoritarian entity—[is] assisting in 
the gathering of religious adherents.”353 Teitel expressed particular 
concern that the equal access principle produces unequal effects, favoring 
religions that proselytize over those that do not.354 Likewise, Michael 
Newsom argues that evangelical Protestant activities in the public schools 
visit “psychological harm . . . upon school children belonging to minority 
religious groups and their families.”355 Students in the minority are 
pressured by the evangelism of the (assertedly majority) Protestants.356 It 
does not matter, Professor Newsom says, whether the religious activity in 
the school is sponsored or favored by government, or pursued entirely by 
students or other private individuals on the same terms as other private 
groups. That distinction he calls “empty formalism at its worst,” because 
in either case the school gives “instrumental assistance” to Protestant 
religion.357
These arguments greatly oversimplify the circumstances of minorities 
in government settings such as schools. Often the students seeking to meet 
for religious study or prayer are far from a majority or dominant group. 
Even though such groups may be disproportionately evangelical 
Protestant, that fact, as I have already argued, does not make them insiders 
by definition; serious evangelicals are outsiders in many places.358 At my 
own high school in a rock-ribbed Republican Chicago suburb in the late 
1970s, it would have been ludicrous to call the small Christian group 
insiders: the football players, cheerleaders, and student council officers 
were definitely elsewhere when the group met at 7:30 a.m., and the 
Christians were looked down upon by many other students. Such evidence 
is highly anecdotal, but I suspect that if student religious groups typically 
drew from the high school insiders, there would be many fewer cases of 
school officials trying to keep them from meeting. 
Indeed, in some ways minority groups have a greater need than others 
to speak in public settings, including public schools. Minority groups must 
take their message out in public settings precisely because they cannot rely 
as heavily on established institutions, preexisting memberships, or quiet 
networking. In the Jehovah’s Witnesses cases, which involved street-
 353. Ruti Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do 
Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 188 (1986). 
 354. Id. at 178–79. 
 355. Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 225. 
 356. Id. at 226–27. 
 357. Id. at 227, 225 (criticizing the protection of religious activity in Mergens and Good News 
Club, among other cases). 
 358. See supra notes 128–32, 140–46, 185–93 and accompanying text. 
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corner and door-to-door campaigns, the Court recognized that the right to 
preach in public settings can be particularly important to small, marginal, 
and less established groups. The Court argued that the Witnesses’ 
distribution of tracts on street corners was analogous to “worship in the 
churches and preaching from the pulpits,” the features of “the more 
orthodox and conventional exercises of religion.”359 And it emphasized 
that “[d]oor to door distribution of circulars,” as the Witnesses undertook, 
“is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.”360 As these 
arguments show, because minority faiths lack a large preexisting base, 
they may find it important not just to speak in general, but to seek converts 
in the public square. Rules that disfavor religious speech or proselytization 
in public settings will likely hamper some minority faiths and adherents. 
This is especially so if, as I have argued, many different groups can 
qualify as minorities in various contexts, including groups that are 
formally Christian but nevertheless in reality are at odds with the majority 
ethos (Christian or secular) in a particular location or institution. The 
argument for the equal access approach, therefore, need not appeal solely 
to the formal version of neutrality or equality. Protection of minorities also 
provides a substantive argument for vigorous protection of truly private 
religious speech in public schools and other government institutions. 
Professor Newsom raises the valid point that facially neutral rules may, 
in their effect, exclude the speech of some religious groups. For example, 
the Equal Access Act’s provision that a group is not protected if 
“nonschool persons . . . direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend” 
student meetings361 appears to exclude a Catholic student fellowship’s 
celebration of mass, which must be conducted by a priest.362 But as in the 
cases of unequal effects from religious conduct exemptions, the solution is 
not to eliminate the statutory religious-liberty right; rather, the right should 
be extended to the excluded group.363 A provision in the Act for student 
groups whose doctrine requires clergy to lead meetings would serve the 
purpose of protecting a range of student groups without doing serious 
damage to the interests of school administration. 
 359. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943). 
 360. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
 361. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d). 
 362. Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 318–19.  
 363. See supra Part III.A.2. It seems likely that the criterion that protected groups under the EAA 
be student-initiated was demanded not by proselytizing evangelicals, to disfavor Catholics, but by 
secular separationists who resisted equal access rights for religious student clubs in the first place. For 
constitutional purposes, groups led by nonschool adults have an equal right to meet in school 
classrooms. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
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At the same time, under a minority-protection approach courts need to 
remain vigilant for signs that the school is taking steps, even through 
subtle messages, to encourage students to attend one group over others. 
Certainly, the equal access principle condemns the kind of official 
favoritism for evangelical student meetings in the Oklahoma case 
discussed earlier in this Article.364
The more difficult question arises when an individual student speaks in 
a setting such as a graduation ceremony, where the number of speakers is 
limited and the audience must listen to their messages.365 When the school 
does not review the content of the speech, and the speaker is chosen by 
neutral criteria—for example, the valedictorian selected on the basis of 
grades—the speech is best characterized as private rather than 
government-sponsored.366 Nevertheless, a minority-protection approach is 
likely to be leery of such speech, far more leery than in the case of 
religious student clubs meeting during an after-school program. Student 
clubs can reflect a wide variety of views; but when only one or a few 
students speak at an event, they will likely reflect the majority’s position 
on religious matters. This will be true simply as a statistical matter, even 
if, as with the valedictorian, the content of the speech truly stems from the 
student’s choice rather than the school’s. Moreover, unlike the situation 
with student clubs, the minority must listen to graduation speakers as a 
condition of attending an important school-sponsored event. For these 
reasons, a minority-protection approach likely supports some restrictions 
on religious content in speech that is the focus of an important school 
event. 
 364. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text (discussing Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985)). In addition, in at least one of its equal-access decisions the 
Court suggested that a school’s allowance of religious group meetings might be more subject to 
Establishment Clause constraints if there is “empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate 
[the] open forum.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). Of course, such a line would be 
difficult for courts to draw, and one might object that as long as students choose to attend a religious 
group without government skewing their decision, the fact that many make this choice should be 
irrelevant to the Establishment Clause analysis. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 
658 (2002); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) (refusing to examine percentage of neutrally 
available financial aid that recipients choose to use at religious schools). For these reasons, drawing 
such a line might not be the best overall interpretation of the Religion Clauses. But examining whether 
a religious group or groups dominate a forum would be called for if the overriding criterion is the 
protection of religious minorities. Even so, in most schools there will be so many nonreligious student 
clubs that religious clubs are unlikely to dominate unless the school somehow gives them 
(unconstitutional) preferential support. 
 365. See, e.g., Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Cole v. 
Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 366. See, e.g., Doe v. Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 
177 F.3d 789 (1999). 
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Therefore, the valedictorian or other student speaker at a school-wide 
event may well present one of the cases where the minority-protection 
emphasis produces a different result than do other Religion Clause 
principles. Other principles cut in favor of protecting the valedictorian’s 
truly personal speech: the valedictorian’s own rights of free exercise and 
free speech, the equal status of religious perspectives with nonreligious 
ones, and so forth. But if the decisive principle is the protection of 
religious minorities, then the student’s speech is less likely to be protected. 
C. Government Financial Aid to Religious Institutions 
The final major category of Religion Clause cases involves the 
participation of religious entities in government financial-aid programs. 
The law here has changed dramatically in recent years, more so than in 
any other area of government-religion disputes. The Court of the 1970s 
and early 1980s was quite hostile to the receipt of aid by religious schools 
or the families using them.367 But in the last two decades, a series of 
decisions have approved the equal inclusion of religious entities in aid 
programs, culminating with school vouchers in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris.368 The shift in decisions can be understood as a shift in the primary 
value underlying the Court’s analysis: from a strong separation of church 
and state in the no-aid decisions to a greater emphasis recently on equal 
treatment of religious schools and the choices of parents to use those 
schools.369
The majority academic view is that the restriction of government aid, 
like other principles of strict church-state separation, works to protect 
religious minorities—and conversely, that the greater acceptance of such 
aid will harm minorities. The arguments against aid fall into several lines. 
First, even when aid is given under facially religion-neutral criteria, it will 
tend to benefit majority faiths and not minorities. In part this is because 
 367. Decisions from that period invalidating aid include Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 
(1975); Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 
402 (1985). 
 368. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Previous decisions in the sequence include Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388 (1983); Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Agostini 
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402); and Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793 (2000) (partially overruling Meek, 421 U.S. 349). 
 369. For fuller accounts, see THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 236–
50 (2d ed. 2004); Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 16–21 (2000); Ira C. Lupu, 
The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 242–50 (1994). 
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the criteria for recipient schools will tend to favor schools of familiar 
faiths like Catholicism and “exclude participation by schools run by 
smaller, less ‘traditional’ faiths.”370 In part it is because “[t]here simply 
will not be enough children of a minority faith in many communities to 
allow for the creation of a religious school” that could benefit from aid.371 
Second, providing aid to religious and other private entities will drain 
resources from state institutions, such as the public schools, that accept 
and appeal to students of all faiths.372 Finally, if religious entities receiving 
aid continue to be able to favor members of their own faith in hiring, 
adherents of minority faiths will face increasing limits on their ability to 
get jobs.373
Although some of these concerns are substantial, there are also strong 
arguments that the inclusion of religious entities in benefits programs 
helps many people with minority religious views. As Alan Brownstein, 
one of the most thoughtful critics of aid programs, acknowledges, benefits 
such as school vouchers help families in need: “parents [who are] trying to 
educate their children according to their religious faith, but [are] worrying 
about how they can continue to pay their children’s tuition bills.”374 
Families with non-mainstream religious views are among those most 
likely to need financial assistance for their educational choices. First, such 
families are especially likely to be alienated from the ethos of the public 
schools and to consider a religious school alternative. The public schools 
 370. Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of “Private Choice” for Constitutional Analysis, 38 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549, 559 (2002); see also Brownstein, supra note 1, at 920 (arguing that 
because of “conditions attached to vouchers, access to religious schools and the resulting benefits such 
access provides may be far more available to certain religions than others”). See generally Alan 
Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech 
Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 252–66 (1999) [hereinafter Brownstein, Neutrality]. 
 371. Brownstein, supra note 1, at 921; see also id. at 877; Green, supra note 370, at 559 
(“[V]ouchers will benefit those faiths with established private schools and existing support structures: 
Catholics, Lutherans, and Orthodox Jews. . . . [O]ther faiths desiring to establish private schools will 
find themselves at a distinct competitive disadvantage, particularly considering the start-up costs 
associated with creating new schools.”); Levinson, supra note 4, at 53 (“[S]ince the vast majority of 
parochial schools are operated by mainstream religions, i.e., over eighty percent are affiliated with the 
Catholic Church, the Court’s willingness to allow aid to parochial schools does not really reflect a 
concern for minority religious interests.”). 
 372. See Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 341, 350 (1999) (presenting the argument, and then rejecting it); cf. Brownstein, supra 
note 1, at 877 (arguing that religious minorities will suffer “if . . . educational services are fragmented 
along religious lines”). 
 373. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 1, at 877 (objecting that citizens will be “unable to compete 
for jobs funded by public resources . . . solely because they do not subscribe to a particular religious 
faith”). 
 374. Id. 
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are generally majoritarian institutions, subject to the control of elected 
school boards and responsive to influence from the largest and most 
powerful voices in the community. Dissenting families’ objections to the 
public school culture may apply to only certain issues, such as sex 
education, or the objections may extend to the school’s overall atmosphere 
and its lack of explicit religious elements. But if the objections are 
sufficient to incline the parents to choose a religious school as a matter of 
conscience, then the parents are cultural dissenters. Perhaps those groups 
most alienated from majority culture will fall outside the criteria for 
government aid; but any group that emphasizes the need for separate 
schooling is countercultural to some degree. 
In addition, if religious “minorities” are defined in terms of their 
outsider cultural status, they may also be disproportionately of modest 
economic status. As such, they would feel greater pressure from the 
financial incentive presented by tuition-free public schools; and they may 
also have less ability to fund private schools within their religious 
community. The fact that many of these groups do not currently operate 
private schools is not decisive. The question is what universe of schools 
would develop once aid is provided on equal terms, including new schools 
that form as a result of the availability of aid. 
In Zelman, the school voucher case, several Orthodox Jewish groups—
members of a quintessential religious minority—filed an amicus brief 
explaining their community’s interest in participating equally in voucher 
programs.375 The brief states that “Jewish education is a key, if not the 
key, to Jewish continuity and survival”; “Jewish religious school 
education is the most reliable means of teaching the values of the Jewish 
faith to Jewish children”; but “[m]any Jewish schools, especially those that 
service children from low-income backgrounds, struggle mightily to meet 
skyrocketing budgets,” and “many Jewish parents are financially unable to 
pay even the minimum necessary to gain entrance to a Jewish day 
school.”376 Voucher programs “enable parents with even the most modest 
means to select [Jewish and other] alternatives to designated public 
schools.”377 The brief reflected the longstanding position of Orthodox 
 375. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Policy at 3–4, 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), available at 2001 
WL 1480708. 
 376. Id. at 3–4. 
 377. Id. at 4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 919 Berg book pages.doc 3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
994 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
groups, dating back to the 1960s.378 It rests squarely on the premise that 
distinctively Jewish schooling is preferable to the secular public schools. 
A government aid program not only can protect religious minorities, it 
can do so, in theory, on an equal basis. Programs of aid to private religious 
schools can extend to all religious groups that choose to operate schools, 
subject to criteria ensuring basic educational quality. Government aid to 
private schools therefore can respect religious minorities far more than 
does government sponsorship of religion in the public schools. When the 
government itself speaks religiously, it must choose one religious 
perspective to advance or promote; and as I have already argued, the 
government’s choice is especially likely to favor majority religious views. 
By contrast, aid programs can be far more even-handed toward minority 
views. 
The critics’ arguments about the impact of government aid on religious 
minorities do not necessarily show that such aid should be forbidden. First, 
although some groups will be better situated than others to benefit from 
school aid, this disparate impact exists as much or more when only public 
schools are funded. The funding preference for public schools creates, in 
Eugene Volokh’s words, “a powerful ‘disparate impact’ favoring secular 
uses and disfavoring religious uses.”379 More precisely, public-school-only 
funding has a disparate impact on those religious groups that cannot accept 
the secular approaches to education in the public schools and that therefore 
have a conscientious impulse to create their own schools. If small religious 
groups find it difficult to create schools with the help of government 
benefits, they must find it even more difficult to do so without such aid. If 
families of minority faiths are likely to be left behind in public schools 
under a voucher program, this is even more likely to happen without 
vouchers.380 On the face of it, vouchers should make matters easier for 
religious minorities.381
 378. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 240–41; IVERS, supra note 88, at 152, 176–78. 
 379. Volokh, supra note 372, at 348.  
 380. To quote Professor Volokh again: “True, [under school choice] some poor parents will still 
be unable to find a school that fits their particular religious beliefs—but under the current system, 
many more parents are in this boat.” Id. at 350. 
 381. The concern that the eligibility standards for government aid programs will disfavor minority 
religions, see supra note 370 and accompanying text, can also be addressed. If a criterion for eligibility 
excludes minority religious schools from participating because it conflicts with the minority’s beliefs 
or practices, the criterion could be struck down as an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of 
government assistance, unless it serves substantial state educational interests. As I have emphasized at 
various points, the best protection for minority religions may come not by strictly separating church 
and state, but by permitting state accommodation of religion while taking steps to make sure that 
accommodations extend to minority faiths. See supra notes 221–22, 284–89, 362–63 and 
accompanying text. 
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The argument that aid to religious entities worsens the position of 
minority faiths, therefore, depends on the premise that public schools 
constitute an acceptable option for minority faiths. If the public schools 
are acceptable to minority adherents, then shifting some share of 
government assistance to religious schools (among other private schools) 
produces little added benefit for the minority and merely benefits larger 
faiths. Indeed, the critics warn, the shift may drain resources from the 
public schools, impairing their ability to serve as the acceptable 
educational alternative for families of all faiths.382
We should not assume, however, that public schools are acceptable for 
all minority faiths. For the reasons above, those believers who dissent 
from the dominant culture are especially likely to dissent from various 
aspects of the public schools and strongly prefer a religious alternative. As 
I have argued earlier, conflicts between religious and secular orientations, 
or between countercultural and acculturated perspectives, are among the 
most important conflicts in American religious life today.383 The 
arguments of the Orthodox groups in Zelman confirm that some minority 
faiths regard the secular orientation of public schools as unacceptable for 
their children. Arguments about what best protects and equalizes minority 
faiths should not rest on the simplistic assumption that a secular education 
is “neutral” for people of all faiths. 
But the world is not perfect, certainly not for members of minority 
religions. Religious schools may be the ideal for many groups, but some 
groups will be unable to start them even with vouchers. Public schools 
with their secular orientation are not neutral toward religion, but they may 
offer the “second best” choice for religious minorities—preferable, for 
many such parents, to sending their children to a school that explicitly 
teaches them the doctrines of another faith. Thus many minority faiths 
have opposed aid to religious schools, adopting the notion of a strictly 
secular government not as a moral or theological ideal, but as a pragmatic 
 Including exemptions from the eligibility terms of a government aid program will raise objections 
that the Establishment Clause prohibits any advantages for religion in the provision of affirmative aid. 
See, e.g., Brownstein, Neutrality, supra note 370. I concede, as I have throughout this Article, that 
other Religion Clause principles may need to be taken into account, such as equal treatment between 
religious and secular beneficiaries. My only point is that if we focus solely on the minority-protection 
principle, it can call for the provision of aid with appropriate accommodations, rather than the denial 
of aid. 
 382. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
 383. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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strategy for minimizing the risk of being explicitly oppressed by 
government promoting the majority faith.384
In addition, minority religious groups may be independently worried 
that aid programs will “fragment” social institutions along religious lines, 
reducing the opportunities for minority adherents to interact with those in 
the majority.385 Such interaction, it is argued, is important because “it 
serves to dissolve the barriers between groups that permit the abuse of 
discrete and insular minorities.”386 Decreased integration in important 
areas of life decreases the “fluidity, mix of relationships, and mutuality of 
interests” that encourage understanding between groups: as a result, the 
“needs and interests [of minorities might] be easily isolated from those of 
others and could be safely ignored without the majority incurring any costs 
or burdens itself.”387
On the other hand, some religious-minority families may find even the 
schools of other faiths preferable to a public-school education devoid of 
any religious elements.388 They may not equal the numbers who prefer 
public schools as a second best option. But remember that a voucher 
program would also increase the number of families who would be able to 
attend schools run by their own faith—and for whom that ability 
outweighs any decrease in religious integration caused by a move away 
from public schools.  
In other words, calculating the effect of aid programs on religious 
minorities is quite complicated. Like many of the issues discussed in this 
Article, the effect will vary in different places around the nation. If 
constitutional doctrine under the Religion Clauses is to emphasize the 
protection of minority religions, how should it handle this uncertainty and 
complexity? 
One plausible response in such a situation is to defer to the decisions of 
the political branches. The uncertainty and complexity of a problem means 
that judges cannot have confidence that one solution will serve 
constitutional values better than the alternatives. When no clear 
 384. See, e.g., Newsom, Common School Religion, supra note 154, at 334 (defending “strategic 
separationism” and “strategic secularism” as a posture for religious minorities; arguing “that children 
need religious instruction, but that it should take place elsewhere than the common schools” so as to 
foreclose “majoritarian religion subjugating religious minorities”). 
 385. See Brownstein, supra note 1, at 903. 
 386. Id. at 923–24. 
 387. Id. at 924. 
 388. See, e.g., ANTHONY BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 297–304 
(1993) (describing how families of other faiths choose Catholic schools because of schools’ moral 
teaching, discipline, and sense of community). 
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constitutional answer exists, the default approach is to leave the decision 
to the legislature or the relevant executive agency. And the Supreme Court 
may be settling on this solution with respect to the participation of 
religious entities in government aid programs. After Zelman, states are 
permitted to include religious elementary and secondary schools in 
voucher programs. But after Locke v. Davey,389 states have discretion to 
exclude theology students from state programs of college scholarships. 
Locke may be limited to the special case of students training for the 
ministry.390 But some passages in the opinion indicate the Court’s broader 
desire to give states “room for play in the joints” between free exercise 
and separationist approaches concerning government aid.391 If that 
emphasis continues, then with vouchers and other benefit programs as 
well, states would be free to include religious choices but would not have 
to do so. 
But deference to the political branches, however sensible in the 
abstract, is inappropriate for an approach emphasizing protection and 
equalization of minorities. As in other areas of church-state disputes, 
leaving questions concerning government aid to the political branches will 
tend to produce majoritarian results. Religious schools will be included in 
aid programs in states where the faiths that operate such schools are 
numerous or powerful. But religious schools will be excluded in states 
where many citizens are suspicious of religious education—as is the case 
in Washington, the state with the exclusion at issue in Locke, which has 
the least religious population in the nation.392 Deference to such political 
decisions fails to serve the goal of protecting whoever happens to be the 
minority in the particular state. 
A better way to accommodate the varying interests of minority 
religions is to allow religious education to participate in programs of 
government educational benefits, but to take steps to ensure that this does 
 389. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 390. See id. at 721 (describing ministerial training as a distinct category of instruction” with “no 
counterpart with respect to [secular] callings or professions”). 
 391. Id. at 718 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
 392. In the 2001 ARIS survey, 25 percent of Washington state respondents indicated “no religion” 
as their identity—the highest of any state—compared with 14 percent nationwide. See ARIS Survey, 
supra note 150 (Exhibit 15); see also KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 119, at 89 tbl.3-1 (reporting 
Washington with second highest “no religion” percentage in 1990); id. at 83 (describing the Pacific 
Northwest as “the most unchurched region of the United States,” because its mobile population 
“creates people without ties” and its “pristine environment [acts] as a distraction from organized 
religion”). When one adds the relatively large number with no religious identity to the always large 
number with only weak identity, it suggests that those who take their religion seriously enough to 
desire a religiously grounded education for their children are likely to be a decided minority in the 
state. 
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not create pressure for children to be exposed to religious teaching from 
other faiths against their families’ conscientious wishes. 
One such measure appears in Milwaukee’s school voucher program, 
which guarantees the parents or guardian of any voucher student the right 
to opt the child out of “participat[ing] in any religious activity” at her 
private school.393 If a family does not wish its child to be exposed to 
another religion’s doctrines, but the other religion’s schools are the only 
available ones with strong educational performance or disciplinary 
policies, the opt-out right offers protection. It allows the family to reap the 
educational benefits of the other faith’s school without submitting their 
children to its religious teaching. But the opt-out provision alone is 
probably not an adequate solution for minorities. Merely by being on the 
premise of the other faith’s school, children will still receive some 
exposure to its teaching. Moreover, to the extent that the mere 
fragmentation of education into private institutions hurts minorities, this 
fragmentation can occur even if minorities in those private institutions 
may opt out of religious exercises. Finally, the opt-out provision may also 
interfere with the school’s own educational program, since religious 
teaching may be quite important to its educational philosophy, and 
therefore may be integrated throughout the curriculum. 
Another possible solution is to include religious education in aid 
programs but to require that there must remain public or other secular 
entities to serve families who belong to religious groups that cannot or do 
not wish to establish their own institutions. These schools would continue 
to serve as the second-best option for such minorities. Of course, almost 
certainly the public schools will remain in any jurisdiction that adopts a 
voucher program; the warning that no public or secular alternatives will 
remain is greatly overblown.394
Admittedly, however, it is a separate question whether the public or 
other secular entities will be adequate in substance to preserve sufficient 
choice for religious minorities. To address this concern, the Court can 
build on the standard it already set forth in Zelman. There the majority 
premised its approval of voucher aid to religious schools in part on the fact 
that parents had “genuine opportunities . . . to select secular educational 
options for their school-age children.”395 The genuine secular options for 
parents of Cleveland school children included public magnet schools, 
public charter (“community”) schools, supplemental tutoring in the regular 
 393. 27 WIS. STAT. § 4008e (1995). 
 394. Volokh, supra note 372, at 350. 
 395. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655 (2002). 
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Cleveland public schools, and a number of secular private schools.396 With 
all these secular alternatives counted, less than 20 percent of the Cleveland 
students “enrolled in nontraditional schools” in a given year were 
attending religious schools.397
The requirement of “genuine secular options” articulated in Zelman can 
be used to provide reasonable assurance that members of minority faiths 
will not be pressured into schools operated by other faiths. To ensure such 
protection, courts would have to give some content to the requirement of 
secular options. Both the Zelman dissents and subsequent commentators 
have charged that the majority’s application of the standard was too lax, 
allowing children to be “steered . . . toward religious experience” because 
of the poor quality of the public-school alternatives.398 In previous work, I 
have responded that the requirement of secular options should not read too 
strictly, lest it rigidly bar voucher programs and therefore guarantee that 
many families will continue to suffer state discrimination and be “steered” 
away from their choice of religious education.399 I raised that argument 
under an approach that did not emphasize protecting religious minorities, 
but rather emphasized respecting individual choice and the equal status of 
religion in public life.400 But if the focus is instead on protecting minorities 
(as in this Article), it may call for a somewhat more demanding 
assessment of whether the secular options are adequate, to minimize the 
extent to which religious minorities are driven by educational necessity 
into religious schools that contradict their faith. 
But even under a minority-protection approach, the standard for 
judging the adequacy of secular alternatives should not be strict. Again, to 
demand too much of the secular options is to prevent any inclusion of 
religious choices in the program. And that will harm those minority 
adherents—like the Orthodox Jews who spoke out in Zelman—whose 
consciences demand that they educate their children in an atmosphere that 
promotes their faith.401
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. at 659. 
 398. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 92, at 947; see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684–85 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he emergency [in Cleveland’s public system] may have given some families a 
powerful motivation to leave the public school system and accept religious indoctrination that they 
would otherwise have avoided.”). 
 399. Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 151, 162–63 (2003). 
 400. See id. at 156–57, 187–88. 
 401. The requirement of genuine secular options also addresses the concern that minority religious 
adherents may be substantially denied job opportunities. See supra note 373 and accompanying text. If 
there remain significant numbers of secular schools or social services—which presumably have no 
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I do not claim that these arguments for government aid are open and 
shut. Whether the provision of aid on equal terms to religious entities will 
protect and equalize minority religions, or harm them, is a complicated 
question, with no single answer true in all circumstances and locations. 
But in the past it has too often been assumed that only the “no aid” 
position protects minorities. If courts and commentators recognize that the 
issue is complex, and that there is a substantial minority-oriented case in 
favor of aid, then this Article will have served a worthwhile purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Protecting minority religions is an attractive goal for the Religion 
Clauses: not the only goal, but an important one. But we need to realize 
two things about such an approach. First, the case for making minority 
protection an important aspect of the Religion Clauses must be explicitly 
set forth and defended; I have tried to do so in Part I. 
Second, the minority-protection approach is more complicated than 
most previous scholarship has acknowledged. The complications arise first 
in defining which religions are “minorities” or “outsiders.” Complexities 
in those definitions, I have argued in Part II, mean that a minority-
protection approach should not try to identify certain groups as 
everywhere and always minorities, but rather should develop 
constitutional rules that protect whoever turns out to be a minority in a 
given context. 
The next stage—assessing what constitutional rules will actually 
protect minorities in the various categories of Religion Clause cases—is 
also more complicated than previous commentators have acknowledged. 
Protection of religious minorities equates with strict separation of church 
and state in some categories of disputes, but not in all. In particular, there 
is a far better minority-protection case than has been admitted for 
including religious entities, and the persons who use them, in programs of 
government financial aid. 
religious criteria for hiring decisions—then the effects on the employment opportunities of religious 
minorities will be limited. 
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